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Self-Control and Saving 
for Retirement 
In Lake Wobegone we believe in salting money away, not only as an investment 
but also to remove it as a temptation. 
Garrison  Keillor' 
Some experts have called for easing penalties on early withdrawals  from savings 
plans, believing people will invest more if they know they can get their money if 
they need it. But most Americans appear wary of such changes, fearful of the 
temptation to raid their own nest eggs. Sixty percent of Americans say it is better 
to keep, rather than loosen, legal restrictions on retirement  plans so that people 
don't use the money  for other things. Only 36 percent prefer to make it easier for 
people to tap such savings before their retirement. 
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1. Quoted in Laura Pedersen-Pietersen,  "From Lake Wobegone and Beyond, A 
Round  Table on Economics  and Finance,'"New  York  Times, February  8, 1998, p. C4. 
2.  Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 28). 
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CONSUMERS  FACE TWO challenges: making  good decisions and sticking 
to them. Economists have adopted optimistic assumptions on both 
counts. The consumers in mainstream  economic models are assumed 
both to be exceptionally good decisionmakers  and to be able to carry 
out their plans. These economic assumptions  are dubious, particularly 
in regard  to saving for retirement. 
First, economists overestimate  sophistication  in decisionmaking.  In 
fact, numerous  studies have documented  the very low level of financial 
sophistication of the typical American consumer.3  In a 1996 poll of 
nonretired  Americans  over the age of twenty-six, the Employee  Benefit 
Research Institute (EBRI) found that only 32 percent had "tried to 
figure out how much money [they would] need to have saved by the 
time [they  retired]  so that [they  could] live comfortably  in retirement."4 
Second, economists assume that intentions  and actions are aligned. 
But examples of a systematic gap between intentions and actions 
abound. Consider  the two pack a day cigarette  smoker  who decided to 
quit years ago but, despite ongoing attempts, still has not kicked the 
habit. Consider the employee who perpetually arrives late at work, 
resolving day after day to get up a little earlier in the future. In New 
Year's resolutions, one commits to eat more healthily, exercise more 
regularly,  and  watch  television less frequently,  but  many  of these prom- 
ises fail. Such failures  consistently  arise in problems  involving delayed 
gratification.  The consumer  resolves, plans, desires  to avoid an activity 
associated  with instantaneous  gratification,  but subsequently  succumbs 
to the temptation.  Few people claim to have the opposite type of prob- 
lem: smoking  too few cigarettes, getting to work  too early, or watching 
too little television.5 Indeed, such problems  are so unusual  that many 
3.  See, for example, Bernheim  (1994, 1995); Farkas  and Johnson  (1997). 
4.  1996 Retirement  Confidence  Survey, cosponsored  by the Employee Benefit Re- 
search Institute, Matthew  Greenwald  and Associates, and the American  Savings Edu- 
cation Council;  cited by Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 34). 
5.  The eating disorder anorexia nervosa may represent  one of the few counter- 
examples to this claim. However, it is not clear that it should be conceptualized  as a 
reversal  of the delay of gratification  problem.  Anorexia  nervosa  is associated  with both 
short-term  disutility (hunger, malaise) and long-term  disutility (malnutrition,  death). 
Hence rather  than yielding too much long-term  felicity at the expense of short-term 
felicity,  the disorder leads to lower utility flows at all times. "Workaholics" may 
provide a better, although  still imperfect,  example of behavior  that is characterized  by 
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of them do not even seem intuitively plausible. People have a syste- 
matictendency  to err-as  judged by their own standards-in the direc- 
tion of instantaneous  gratification. 
The gap between intentions and actions is also evident in life-cycle 
saving, and this is the focus of our paper. Three types of evidence 
document the troubling  temptation  of immediate gratification.6  First, 
popular  and professional  financial  advice highlights the value of using 
external commitments to prevent overconsumption.I  From the New 
York  Times, for example: "Use whatever  means possible to remove a 
set amount  of money from your bank account each month before you 
have a chance to spend it.' '8  Or from American  Express: "If you wait 
until the end of the month to put money into your investments, you'll 
probably  encounter  months  in which there's nothing  left over. To keep 
this from happening,  pay yourself first  by having money set aside from 
each paycheck  into a savings account  or 401(k) plan."9 Financial  plan- 
ners routinely advise their clients to cut up credit cards, to leave them 
at home or in a safe deposit box, to use excess withholding  as a forced 
saving device, and to use Christmas  clubs, vacation clubs, and other 
low-interest, low-liquidity goal clubs to regulate saving flows.10  And 
in 1995 American  consumers  deposited  their  holiday savings in roughly 
10 million Christmas  club accounts.11  Their use of such commitment 
devices implies that consumers have, and are aware of, problems of 
self-control. 
Self-reports  about  preferred  consumption  paths  provide  a second  type 
of evidence for the gap between intentions and actions. Consumers 
report  a preference  for flat or rising real consumption  paths, even when 
the real interest  rate is zero and the budget  constraint  is made explicit- 
6.  This evidence is reviewed in Laibson  (1998). 
7.  Such advice may be directed  primarily  at people who have a problem  saving, and 
so may not be generalizable. 
8.  Deborah  M. Rankin, "How to Get Ready for Retirement:  Save, Save, Save," 
New York  Times, March  13, 1993, p. 33 ("Your Money" column). 
9.  American  Express  Financial  Advisors (1996, p. 14). 
10. For interesting  evidence on the relatively widespread  use of intentional  over- 
withholding, even in the absence of penalties for underwithholding,  see Shapiro  and 
Slemrod (1995). 
11. Simmons  Market  Research  Bureau  (1996). 94  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
that is, higher  future  consumption  implies lower current  consumption.  12 
But they actually  implement  downward-sloping  consumption  paths  when 
they  are  not  effectively  liquidity  constrained.  13 Moreover,  in the  late 1990s 
the typical  baby  boomer  household  is saving  well below the rate  required 
to finance  a standard  of living in retirement  comparable  to that  it currently 
enjoys.  14 
Survey  data  contrasting  actual  and normative  saving rates  provide  the 
third  type of evidence  for the gap between  intentions  and  actions.  A 1997 
survey  by Public  Agenda  finds  that  76 percent  of respondents  believe that 
they should  be saving more  for retirement.  15 Of those who feel that  they 
are at a point in their lives when they "should be seriously saving al- 
ready," only 6 percent  report  being "ahead" in their saving, while 55 
percent  report  being "behind."  16 The report  concludes:  "The gaps be- 
tween people's attitudes, intentions, and behavior are troubling and 
threaten  increased  insecurity  and dissatisfaction  for people when they 
retire.  Americans  are  simply  not doing  what  logic-and  their  own reason- 
ing-suggests  that  they should  be doing.'917  These findings  echo a 1993 
Luntz  Webber-Merrill  Lynch  survey  of baby  boomers  (that  is, consumers 
between the ages of twenty-nine  and forty-seven).18  Respondents  were 
asked, "What  percentage  of your annual  household  income  do you think 
you should save for retirement?  ('Target saving')"; and then, "What 
percentage  of your annual household income are you now saving for 
retirement?  ('Actual saving')." The median  reported  gap between  target 
and actual  saving is 10 percent  and the mean gap is 11.1 percent;  77.2 
percent  of respondents  believe that  they are  saving  too little  for  retirement, 
and 70.7 percent  believe that  the shortfall  represents  at least 5 percent  of 
12. Barsky and others (1997). See Loewenstein  and Sicherman  (1991) for related 
evidence. 
13. Gourinchas  and Parker  (1997). 
14. Bernheim  (1995). Bernheim  points out that  this calculation  assumes  a best case 
scenario: he assumes that all savings are available for retirement,  and that mortality 
rates, tax rates, social security  benefits, medicare  benefits, and  health  care costs do not 
change during the next fifty years. For a critique of his calculations, see William G. 
Gale, "Will the Baby Boom be Ready for Retirement?",  Brookings  Review, Summer 
1997, pp. 4-9. 
15. Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 9). 
16. Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 33). 
17. Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 27). 
18. Analyzed in Bernheim  (1995), from which the following numbers  are taken. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  95 
income. Only  4.7 percent  of respondents  report  that  they are  saving  above 
their  target  rate. 
Standard  economic theories allow consumers  to make mistakes but 
imply that  those mistakes  will not be systematic:  they will tend not to lie 
in the same  direction.  By contrast,  the evidence  reviewed  above  indicates 
that  most  consumers  view themselves  as saving  too little. Such  systematic, 
self-acknowledged  error  contradicts  the standard  economic  model of the 
maximizing  consumer.  19 This paper  explores  an alternative  model, from 
the psychology  literature,  that can make sense of the apparent  conflicts 
between  attitudes,  intentions,  and  behavior  in the domain  of saving. 
Research  on both animal  and  human  behavior  has led psychologists  to 
conclude  that  short-run  discount  rates  are  much  higher  than  long-run  rates. 
Such preferences  are formally  modelled  with discount  functions  that are 
generalized  hyperbolas:  events T periods  away are  discounted  with factor 
(I  +  ?UT)  -  with ox, y >  0. This discount  structure  sets up a conflict 
between today's preferences  and those that will be held in the future, 
implying  that  preferences  are  dynamically  inconsistent.  For  example,  from 
today's perspective,  the discount  rate  between  two far off periods,  t and 
t +  1, is a long-term  low discount  rate;  however,  from  the time t perspec- 
tive, it is a short-term  high discount rate. This type of  "change" in 
preference  is reflected  in many  common  experiences.  For  example,  today 
one may desire  to start  an aggressive  saving plan next month  (that  is, to 
act patiently  next month), but when next month  rolls around,  one will 
want  to postpone  any sacrifice  by another  month. 
Hence hyperbolic  consumers  will report  a gap between  what  they feel 
they should  save and  what  they actually  do save. Normative  saving  rates 
will lie above actual  saving rates, since short-run  preferences  for instan- 
taneous gratification  will undermine  a consumer's  effort to implement 
long-run  optimal  plans.  However,  the hyperbolic  consumer  is not doomed 
to be an  underachiever.  Commitment  devices  such  as pensions  and  illiquid 
assets can help the hyperbolic  consumer  commit  to the patient,  welfare- 
enhancing  course of action. The availability  of illiquid assets is thus a 
19. There is an alternative  interpretation  of this evidence. Consumers  may report 
that  they are  behind  in their  saving  because  they would like to have more  savings, ceteris 
paribus  (that is,  they would like to have more savings, holding current  consumption 
constant). However, this interpretation  would not explain why consumers  prefer  rising 
consumption  paths-holding  the net present  value of the consumption  stream  constant- 
but actually  implement  downward-sloping  consumption  paths. 96  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
critical  determinant  of national  saving  rates, as well as of consumer  wel- 
fare. But too much illiquidity  can be problematic.  Consumers  face sub- 
stantial  uninsurable  labor income risk and need liquid assets to smooth 
their  consumption.  Hyperbolic  agents  seek financial  instruments  that  strike 
the right  balance  between  commitment  and  flexibility. 
The hyperbolic  model helps us to analyze  the problem  of undersaving 
in the United  States. It enables  economists  to assess the likely magnitude 
of undersaving  and  to identify  the types of financial  instruments  that  will 
alleviate  the problem.  For example, one goal of this paper  is to evaluate 
tax-deferred  defined contribution  (DC) pension plans. We ask whether 
these instruments  increase national  saving and consumer  welfare, and 
whether  they are more effective in an economy  populated  by consumers 
with problems  of self-control. 
To answer  such questions,  we develop and  calibrate  a numerical  sim- 
ulation  model. We build our framework  on three  organizing  principles. 
The first  two echo the approach  of Eric Engen, William  Gale, and John 
Scholz, who also use a simulation  model to evaluate  the efficacy of tax- 
deferred  DC pension  plans.20  First, our model adopts  the standard  tech- 
nological assumptions  of mainstream  consumption  models, such as those 
originally  developed  by Christopher  Carroll  and Angus Deaton.21 These 
authors  assume  a realistic  income process  and incomplete  markets:  con- 
sumers  cannot  borrow  against  uncertain  future  labor  income. Second, we 
include  two illiquid  retirement  assets  in a consumer's  portfolio:  an illiquid 
defined  benefit  pension plan and a partially  illiquid DC plan. The third 
assumption-the fundamental  innovation  in our  paper-is  that  consumers 
have hyperbolic  discount  functions.  We show that  the hyperbolic  assump- 
tion has important  implications  for both positive and normative  conclu- 
sions about saving behavior. Our analysis complements  the large and 
active empirical  literature  on the efficacy of tax-deferred  saving instru- 
ments  such as Individual  Retirement  Accounts  (IRAs)  and  401(k) plans.22 
We do not come down firmly  on one side or the other, but instead  find 
that one's conclusions about the efficacy of these instruments  depend 
critically  on poorly  identified  features  of consumer  preferences. 
As we are the first  to simulate  the behavior  of a hyperbolic  consumer 
20.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994). 
21.  See Carroll  (1992) and Deaton (1991). 
22.  For reviews of this literature,  see Hubbard  and Skinner  (1996); Poterba,  Venti, 
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facing a realistic  life-cycle decision problem,  we evaluate  the empirical 
validity of the hyperbolic  model before turning  to the efficacy of tax- 
deferred  DC pension plans. We first describe the hyperbolic  discount 
function  and  motivate  our  use of it. Then  we present  our  simulation  model. 
Next, we describe  our calibration  decisions, compare  our choices with 
those of Engen, Gale, and Scholz, and discuss some of the theoretical 
problems  that constrain  our calibration  choices. We then show that the 
calibrated  one asset (that  is, no DC pension  plan)  hyperbolic  economy  is 
nearly  indistinguishable  from  the equivalent  exponential  economy. How- 
ever, we do identify two phenomena  that differ between the calibrated 
one asset hyperbolic  and exponential  economies:  hyperbolic  consumers 
are  more  likely to face binding  liquidity  constraints  and  they are  expected 
to exhibit  the missing  precautionary  saving effects documented  by Karen 
Dynan.23 
When we introduce  a second asset, a DC pension modeled after a 
401(k), we find  that  hyperbolic  consumers  show a greater  responsiveness 
than exponential  consumers,  reflected  in both larger  saving effects and 
larger  welfare effects. Our  results are sensitive to the calibration  of the 
coefficient  of relative  risk aversion:  higher  values  significantly  reduce  the 
DC plan  effects in both  exponential  and  hyperbolic  economies.  We discuss 
the robustness  of our findings and conclude with directions  for future 
research. 
Hyperbolic Discount Functions 
There is a systematic conflict between actors' long- and short-term 
preferences. When two alternative  rewards  are far away in time, deci- 
sionmakers  will generally  act relatively patiently:  for example, I prefer 
to take a thirty-minute  work break in 101 days, rather  than a fifteen- 
minute  break  in one hundred  days. But when both rewards  are brought 
forward in time, decisionmakers  reverse their preferences, becoming 
more impatient:  I prefer  to take a fifteen-minute  break  right  now, rather 
than a thirty-minute  break tomorrow. Evidence of such reversals has 
been found  in experiments  using a wide range  of real  rewards,  including 
23.  Dynan  (1993). 98  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
money, durable goods, fruit juice, sweets, video rentals, relief from 
noxious noise, and access to video games.24 
A number  of authors  have used multiple-self frameworks  to model 
this gap between short-  and  long-term  preferences.25  They highlight  the 
conflict between the long-run desire to be patient and the short-run 
desire for instantaneous  gratification.  This conflict can be captured  in a 
particularly  parsimonious  fashion by allowing discount functions to 
decline at a steeper rate in the short  run than in the long run. The data 
support  this intuition.  When  researchers  use subject  choices to estimate 
the shape of the discount function, the estimates consistently approxi- 
mate  generalized  hyperbolas:  events  T periods  away are  discounted  with 
factor (1 +  cxT)wY/a,  with ox, y >  0.26  This observation  was first made 
by Shin-Ho Chung  and  Richard  Herrnstein  in relation  to animal  behav- 
ior." Their conclusions were later shown to apply to human subjects 
as well.28 
Figure 1 graphs  the standard  exponential  discount  function  (assuming 
the discount factor 8  =  0.951),  the generalized hyperbolic discount 
function (assuming  t =  25  x  104,  y  =  104),  and the quasi-hyperbolic 
discount function-an  analytically convenient approximation  of the 
generalized  hyperbola.  The quasi-hyperbolic  function  is a discrete  time 
function with values {11,  13,  82,  183,  ...};  figure 1 plots the case of 1 
=  0.85  and 8  =  0.964.29  The discrete  points of the quasi-hyperbolic 
24.  See, for example, Solnick and others (1980); Navarick  (1982); Millar and Na- 
varick (1984); King and Logue (1987); Kirby  and Herrnstein  (1995); Kirby  and Mara- 
kovic (1995, 1996); Kirby  (1997); Read and  others  (1998). For a partisan  review of this 
literature,  see Ainslie (1992); for a critique, see Mulligan  (1997). 
25.  See, for example, Thaler  and  Shefrin  (1981); Schelling  (1984); Loewenstein  and 
Prelec (1992); Hoch and Loewenstein  (1991); Akerlof (1991); Ainslie (1992); Laibson 
(1994, 1996, 1997a);  O'Donoghue  and Rabin  (1997a, 1997b). 
26.  See Loewenstein  and Prelec (1992) for an axiomatic  derivation  of this discount 
function. 
27.  Chung  and Herrnstein  (1967) claim that the appropriate  discount  function  is an 
exact hyperbola:  events T periods away are given a weight that is directly proportional 
to 1/.  This discount  function  describes  well-defined  preferences  as long as time-dated 
goods are evaluated  strictly  before the good is actually  consumed.  The exact hyperbola 
generates  the same discount rates as the generalized  hyperbola when (x =  -y  -_  c. 
28.  See Ainslie (1992) for a survey. 
29.  This discount  function  was first  analyzed  by Phelps  and  Pollak  (1968). However, 
their  application  is one of imperfect  intergenerational  altruism,  and the discount  factors 
apply  to nonoverlapping  generations  of a dynasty.  Following  Laibson  (1997a), we apply 
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Figure  1.  Exponential,  Hyperbolic,  and Quasi-Hyperbolic  Discount  Functions: 
Value of discount function 
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a. Figure plots three discount functionis:  exponential:  &T,  with 8 = 0.951I  and r representing  the year; hyper-bolic:  (I +  r)-Y', 
with et = 25  X  104  and y =  104;  and quasi-hyperbolic: I  1,  8,  8  ,,  .  .,  with 3 = 0.85  and 8 = 0.964. 
function have been joined in figure 1. When 0  <  3 <  1, the quasi- 
hyperbolic discount structure  mimics the qualitative  properties  of the 
hyperbolic  discount function, while maintaining  most of the analytical 
tractability  of the exponential  discount  function. We return  to this point 
below. 
Hyperbolic discount functions imply discount rates that decline as 
the discounted  event is moved further  away in time. Events in the near 
future are discounted at a higher implicit discount rate than events in 
the distant future. Given a discount function, f(T), the instantaneous 
discount rate T periods in the future  is defined as 
Phelps and Pollak assume an infinite  horizon, which admits  a continuum  of equilibria; 
see Laibson  (1994). 100  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
_  f(T) 
f(T) 
Hence an exponential  discount function, 6Tr  is characterized  by a con- 
stant discount rate, ln(1/8), while the generalized  hyperbolic  discount 
function is characterized  by an instantaneous  discount  rate that falls as 
T rises: 
1  +  wT 
Psychologists and  economists  believe that  such  declining  discount  rates, 
even if unanticipated, are important  in generating problems of self- 
regulation.30 
These problems  arise because hyperbolic  discount functions induce 
dynamically inconsistent preferences. From the perspective of period 
0, the relevant discount rate for trade-offs in period t is y/(1  +  at). 
However, from the perspective of period t, the relevant discount rate 
for trade-offs  at period t is y/(l  +  t *  0), which is greater  than y/(l  + 
at). Hence an individual's  preferences  at period  0 differ from the same 
individual's preferences  at period t. Self 0 prefers  patient  trade-offs at 
period t, but self t disagrees. In this sense, the hyperbolic  consumer  is 
involved in a decision that sets up an intrapersonal  strategic struggle. 
Early selves would like to commit later selves to honor  the preferences 
of those early selves; however, later selves do their best to maximize 
their  own interests. Economists  have modeled  this situation  as an intra- 
personal  game played among  the consumer's  temporally  situated  selves. 
Hyperbolic  discount functions have recently been used to explain a 
wide range of anomalous  economic choices, including  procrastination, 
deadlines, drug addiction, retirement  timing, and undersaving.31  But 
despite the new developments  in this literature,  hyperbolic  models are 
still much cruder  than their exponential analogs. Intrapersonal  games 
involve much greater  analytic complexity than analogous  nonstrategic 
intertemporal  maximization, and this has hindered  the development  of 
rich, and hence realistic, hyperbolic  analysis. This paper  partly  closes 
30.  See Ainslie (1975, 1986, 1992); Prelec (1989); Loewenstein  and Prelec (1992); 
O'Donoghue  and Rabin  (1997a, 1997b). 
31.  See, for example, Akerlof (1991); Barro  (1997); Diamond  and Koszegi (1998); 
Laibson  (1994,1996,1997a); O'Donoghue  and Rabin  (1997a, 1997b). David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  101 
the gap by introducing a hyperbolic model whose richness matches 
contemporary  exponential models of consumption  over the life cycle. 
Our  approach  represents  a behavioral  alternative  that  can be calibrated, 
and  its quantitative  empirical  predictions  can be compared  directly  with 
those of the leading exponential  consumption  models. The model can 
also generate quantitative forecasts and welfare analysis for policy 
proposals. 
The Model 
In the rest of this paper,  we develop and  evaluate  a simulation  model 
of the behavior  of hyperbolic  consumers.  Simulations  are a critical  tool 
for forecasting  the long-term  effects of newly implemented  policies and 
for evaluating  the short- and long-term  effects of untested  policy pro- 
posals. Our simulation  approach  has a major  shortcoming  that we wish 
to flag in advance: we adopt the standard  economic assumption of 
unlimited sophistication in problem solving.  The consumers in our 
model solve perfectly a complex backwards  induction problem when 
making  choices about consumption  and asset allocation. 
We chose this approach  for two reasons. First, the assumption  of 
perfect  rationality  is the natural  benchmark  for an economist. We make 
this assumption not because it necessarily aptly describes consumer 
behavior, but rather  because it represents  the starting  point for all eco- 
nomic analysis. Second, even if one wanted to weaken assumptions 
about consumer  sophistication, it is not clear how to do so in a parsi- 
monious and realistic fashion. While economists and psychologists 
have a great  deal of evidence that  consumers  are not perfectly rational, 
they do not necessarily know what alternative  to rationality  should be 
adopted. There are no well-developed bounded  rationality  models ap- 
plicable to the problem  of life-cycle saving.32 
We are sympathetic to one alternative, first proposed by Robert 
32.  We are keenly interested  in the recent  developments  in the reinforcement  learn- 
ing literature;  for example, Erev and Roth (1998); Camerer  and Ho (1997). However, 
such reinforcement  models are difficult to apply to the analysis of saving decisions, 
since it is not clear why, or even if, saving decisions are rewarding  in the short run. 
Perhaps  the lack of short- and medium-run  reinforcement  provides an explanation  for 
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Strotz and more recently  studied by George Akerlof and Edward 
O'Donoghue and Matthew Rabin.33  These authors suggest that deci- 
sionmakers with dynamically inconsistent preferences make current 
choices under  the false belief that later selves will act in the interests 
of the current  self. This modeling approach  assumes  that  consumers  do 
not foresee that they will hit the snooze button on their alarm  clocks, 
despite the fact that  they have consistently done so in the past. O'Don- 
oghue and  Rabin  call such consumers  naifs. The naif assumption  strikes 
us as extreme, and perhaps  no more believable than  the assumption  of 
perfect  sophistication.  Both naifs and  sophisticates  are  assumed  to solve 
perfectly a backwards  induction problem:  the naifs with rosy beliefs 
about the good behavior  of future selves ("I will not procrastinate  on 
the next project"), and  the sophisticates  with correct  beliefs ("I always 
procrastinate").  Neither  approach  seems precisely correct  to us, but we 
focus on the sophisticate  model.34 
An Individual's  Consumption Problem 
Taking our cue from the contemporary  consumption  literature,  we 
explicitly model the rich array of constraints and stochastic income 
events that  consumers  face. Such rich models are not analytically  tract- 
able, and therefore they require numerical analysis. Our simulation 
framework  follows most closely the work of Engen, Gale, and Scholz; 
we highlight the assumptions  that distinguish  our analysis from theirs. 
We divide the presentation  of the model into seven domains: demo- 
graphics, income, bequests, asset allocation, taxes, preferences, and 
equilibrium. 
DEMOGRAPHICS. The economy is populated  by consumers  who face 
a time-varying, exogenous hazard  rate of survival st, where t indexes 
age. Consumers  live for a maximum  of T  +  N periods, where T and 
N are exogenous variables  that represent  the maximum  lengths of pre- 
retirement  life and retirement,  respectively. If a consumer is alive at 
age 20  <  t '  T, that consumer is in the workforce. If a consumer  is 
alive at age T <  t '  T +  N, that consumer  is retired. We assume  that 
33.  Strotz  (1956); Akerlof (1991); O'Donoghue  and  Rabin (1997a, 1997b). 
34.  Had we chosen the naif model, we would probably  have found smaller  effects 
of DC plans for hyperbolic  consumers. Naifs do not value the commitment  properties 
of DC plans, because they think  that future  selves will act in the interest  of the current 
self. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  103 
economic life begins at twenty and  do not model consumption  decisions 
before this age. 
We divide our population into three educational categories: con- 
sumers without a high school diploma, high school graduates, and 
college graduates. We take education to be exogenous and assign a 
different  preretirement  life (T), retirement  duration  (N), labor income 
process, and bequest process to each category. 
LABOR INCOME. Labor  effort is supplied  inelastically. Let Yt  represent 
labor income when 20 c  t c  T, and defined benefit pension income 
when T <  t c  T +  N. Let yt  ln(Y,). We refer to yt as labor income, 
regardless  of whether  it is a preretirement  wage payment  or a postre- 
tirement  defined benefit pension payment. During working  life, 
(1)  y,  =  fw(t)  +  uWp 
wheref"(t) is a cubic polynomial in age, uw =  ouw1  + Ew,  and  Ew  is 
normally  distributed,  N (0,  rw).  During  retirement, 
(2)  Yt =fR(t)  ?  u9, 
where  f(t)  is linear in age and uR is distributed  N(O,  Uk2).  The elements 
of the income process-fw(.),  a,  ot  , fR(.  ),  and UR-vary  across edu- 
cational categories. 
Except for the stochastic  component  of retirement  income, our labor 
income process replicates  that used by Glenn Hubbard,  Jonathan  Skin- 
ner, and Stephen Zeldes, and Engen, Gale, and Scholz.3s We choose 
not to use the integrated  labor  income process adopted  by Carroll,  since 
we cannot take advantage  of his technique  of eliminating  a state vari- 
able.36  We are prevented  from doing so by the fact that our problem  is 
not scalable, because we consider simulations  with investment-capped 
tax-deferred assets-for  example, IRAs or 401(k)s-and  fixed tax 
brackets. 
BEQUESTS.  Consumers  receive bequests throughout  their lives. We 
would have liked to make bequests a state variable, but to keep the 
model computationally  tractable  (the model already  has three  state var- 
iables: labor income, liquid assets, and assets in a DC pension plan), 
we instead assume  that  bequests  at time t are  independent  of the history 
of bequests. We believe that this assumption  creates relatively little 
35.  Hubbard,  Skinner,  and  Zeldes (1995); Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994). 
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distortion  in our results, since for the typical real world consumer, the 
timing  and  magnitudes  of bequests  are  difficult  to predict  far  in advance, 
and  the number  of bequests  received over a lifetime should be modeled 
as a stochastic variable. In an ideal model, the probability  of bequest 
realizations  would be negatively autocorrelated. 
We assume  that  the hazard  rate  of receiving a bequest  depends  solely 
on the age of the consumer  and not on the prior  history of bequests: 
(3)  p(t) =  Prob(q  <  h(t) I q  - N(0, U2)), 
where h(-) is a cubic polynomial. This is a standard  probit  formulation. 
Conditional  on receiving a bequest, the natural  logarithm  of the value 
of the bequest, ln(B,)  b(t), is given by 
(4)  b(t) =  g(t) +  m,t 
where g(t) is a cubic polynomial in age, and  t is distributed  N(0, U2). 
The polynomials h(-) and g( ) vary across education  categories. 
Our  bequest  process contrasts  with that  of Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 
who assume deterministic  and homogenous bequests. In their model, 
all forty-five year olds receive identical bequests, regardless  of educa- 
tional level, and consumers  at all other ages receive no bequests. 
ASSETS  AND  THE DYNAMIC BUDGET CONSTRAINT.  We have discussed 
above the income flows associated  with defined  benefit  pensions;  those 
flows appear  in Y,. We now consider DC pensions and regular  liquid 
assets. We focus on the special case in which the DC pension is a 
stylized version of an IRA or a 401(k). 
Let X, represent  liquid asset holdings at age t. Let Zt represent  the 
DC plan. The dynamic budget constraint  is given by 
(S)  Xt+1  +  Zt+1  =  R(Xt  +  Zt  +  Yt  +  Mt  -  ct  -  Tt  +  Bt+,)g 
where R is the gross pretax interest rate, 1  +  r; Bt+, is bequests, 
received on January  1 of year t +  1; Yt  is labor income, received on 
December  31 of year t; M, is the employer  matching  contribution  to the 
DC plan, received on December 31 of year t; Ct is consumption,  chosen 
on December 31 of  year t; and Tt is taxes,  including penalties for 
preretirement  withdrawals  from the DC plan, chosen on December 31 
of year t. 
Let It represent  the employee contribution  to the DC plan. Thus the 
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(6)  Xt+I  + Z  +,  =  R[Xt  +  (Zt  +  It  +  Mt) 
+  Yt  -  It  -  Ct-  Tt+  Bt+1], 
where Z,+I  =  R(Z, +  It +  Me). 
Our assumptions  about  the DC plan, including the matching  provi- 
sions, are  motivated  by existing 401(k) regulations  and  are summarized 
as follows: 
It '  $10,000. 
-If  I  '  0  then M, =  0. 
-If  It >  0,  then Mt =  min{tI,,  44Y,}. 
-If  It  <  0 and t <  60, then the consumer  pays a tax penalty of wI,. 
-If  I,  <  0, then the consumer declares additional  taxable income 
of It. 
-I<  0ift>  T. 
In words, these rules imply that the employee contribution  must be 
less than  or equal to $10,000; if the employee contribution  is negative, 
matching does not occur; if  the employee contribution  is  positive, 
matching  is equal to 4 times the employee contribution,  capping  out at 
(4sY,; if the employee withdraws  money from the 401(k) before age 
sixty, then the employee pays a tax penalty of  100w percent of the 
withdrawal;  withdrawals  from the 401(k) count as taxable  income; and 
no further  contributions  to the 401(k) are allowed after retirement.37 
We assume that employers offset their match payments with a re- 
duction  in preretirement  labor  income payments.  This reduction  applies 
to all workers, whether  or not they contribute  to the DC plan. Specifi- 
cally, we reduce all preretirement  labor income payments by a fixed 
percentage,  A, such that match payments  plus labor income payments 
in the new steady state with the DC plan are equal to labor income 
payments  in the original steady state with no DC plan. We perform  this 
calculation  separately  for each educational  group. Note that the size of 
the adjustment  depends on the saving decisions of consumers, so that 
we have to calculate a different adjustment  factor for each simulation. 
Finding  A requires  numerically  solving a fixed point problem;  A has to 
be adjusted  to offset the level of realized  match  payments,  and  the equi- 
librium  level of realized  match  payments  depends  on the value of A. 
37.  The assumption  about the employee contribution  cap may be too generous, as 
many workers  are constrained  by limits set by the firm  below the IRS limit of approxi- 
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Following Engen, Gale, and Scholz, we assume that in all periods, 
both the X assets and the Z assets are bounded  below by zero: 
x> 0 
These assumptions  do not preclude borrowing  against  X collateral to 
invest in a DC plan, since the collateral and the debt are both in the X 
account. However, we rule out borrowing that uses the Z asset as 
collateral. While many 401(k) plans do have facilities for this type of 
borrowing, they are generally highly restrictive, as discussed below. 
TAXES.  Consumers  face a progressive  tax structure.  Taxable  income 
is 
Yt-  it  ? 
t 
which captures  the tax deductible  nature  of contributions  to the DC plan. 
Recall that  R and  r are  the gross and  net interest  rates,  respectively. 
PREFERENCES. The total utility of self t is given by 
T+N-t 
Ut  =  U(Ct)  +  C  E  bi  st+j)  u(Ct+i), 
=l  j=l 
where u( ) is an isoelastic utility function with coefficient of relative 
risk aversion p. Recall that s, is the probability  of surviving to age t 
conditional on being alive at age t  -  1. These preferences imply no 
bequest motive, and hence realized bequests are purely accidental.38 
To develop an intuition for the parameters  3 and 8,  consider the 
special case in which st is equal to unity for all t. Self t's preferences 
reduce to 
T+N-t 
U, =  U(C,) +  C  Ebiu(Ct+i). 
The discount  function  is the quasi-hyperbolic  function  described  above. 
Note that the discount factor between adjacent  periods n and n  +  1 
38.  In our model, bequest receipts are exogenously specified. We assume that the 
difference between exogenous bequest receipts and endogenous accidental bequests 
reflects estate taxes. Note that  consumers  would leave no accidental  bequests  if a suffi- 
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represents  the weight placed  on utils at time n +  1 relative  to the weight 
placed on utils at time n. From the perspective of self t, the discount 
factor between periods t and t +  1 is j3b, but the discount factor that 
applies between any two later periods is 6. Since we take 3 to be less 
than one, this implies a short-term  discount rate greater  than the long- 
term discount rate. 
Later selves will not validate these preferences. Continuing  to as- 
sume 100 percent survival, the total utility of self t +  1 is given by 
T+N-(t+  1) 
Ut+1=  U(Ct+1)  +  (  E  biu(Ct+  1 +). 
From  the perspective  of self t +  1, (3b  is the relevant  discount  factor 
between periods t +  1 and t +  2. Hence selves t and t +  1 disagree 
about  the desired level of patience at time t +  1. 
When the survival hazard  rates are included, this discount structure 
is only slightly altered. From the perspective of self t, the discount 
factor at time t +  1 is bsts+; from self t +  2's perspective, it is PS,+2. 
EQUILIBRIUM. The dynamic  inconsistency  in preferences  implies that 
the consumption  problem can not be treated as a straightforward  dy- 
namic optimization  problem. Late selves will not implement  the poli- 
cies that are optimal from the perspective of early selves. Following 
the work of Strotz, we model consumption  choices as an intrapersonal 
game.39 Selves {20, 21,  .  .  .,  T  ?  N  -  1, T  +  N} are the players. 
Taking  the strategies  of other  selves as given, self t picks a strategy  for 
time t that is  optimal from its own perspective. This strategy is  a 
mapping  from the state variables, {t, X, Z, Y}, to {C, X, Z}. An equilib- 
rium is a fixed point in the strategy space, such that all strategies are 
optimal  given the strategies  of the other  players. We restrict  our focus 
to Markov equilibria and solve for the equilibrium  strategies using a 
numerically  implemented  backwards  induction  algorithm. 
Our choice of the quasi-hyperbolic  discount function simplifies the 
induction algorithm. Let Vt,t+ I represent  the time t  +  1 continuation 
payoff function of self t. Thus the objective function of self t is 
(7)  u(Ct) +  3bs,Et+Ej[V,,t+(Xt+I,  Zt+I,  Y,+1)]. 
39.  Strotz (1956). 108  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Self t chooses Ct  to maximize this expression. The time t continuation 
payoff function of self t -  1 can be calculated as 
(8)  Vt-,1t(Xt,  Zt,  Y,)  =  u(C)  +  st+,1Et[Vt,t+,1(Xt+,1,  Zt+1  Yt+,1)] 
where Ct is the consumption  chosen by self t. The induction  continues 
in this way. The dynamic  inconsistency in preferences  is evident from 
the fact that a 3 term appears in equation 7,  reflecting the discount 
factor of self t between periods t and t  +  1, but does not appear  in 
equation  8, since self t -  1 does not use the 3 factor  to discount  between 
periods t and t  +  1. 
Equations  7 and 8 jointly define a functional equation  that is not a 
contraction  mapping.  Hence the standard  dynamic  programming  results 
do not apply to this problem. Specifically, V does not inherit  concavity 
from u, the objective function is not single peaked, and the policy 
functions are in general discontinuous  and nonmonotonic.40  We adopt 
a numerically  efficient solution algorithm,  based  on local grid searches, 
which iterates  our  functional  equation  in the presence  of these nonstand- 
ard  properties.  We document  some of the nonstandard  properties  below. 
Calibration 
In this section we discuss our calibration  decisions, except for the 
choice of preference  parameters.  Most of this analysis is standard,  and 
those who desire instantaneous  gratification  may  jump  to the discussion 
of preference  parameter  calibration  without loss of continuity. 
DEMOGRAPHICS.  In our model, consumers live for a maximum of 
ninety years (T  +  N),  although they do not enter the work force or 
make economically meaningful  decisions until age twenty. The condi- 
tional hazard  rates of survival  are taken  from the life tables of the U.S. 
National Center for Health Statistics, which report  the probability  of 
living to age t  +  1, conditional on having lived to age t.41  This one- 
year survival probability  is close to 1 through age seventy, drops to 
96.3 percent  by age eighty, and to 67.6 percent  by age eighty-nine. 
40.  See Laibson  (1997b). 
41.  U.S. National  Center  for Health  Statistics  (1994). David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  109 
Following Engen, Gale, and  Scholz, we use survival  rates  for a single 
individual, even though  the consumers  in our model are  in fact abstrac- 
tions of multiperson  households. Conceptually,  our  model assumes  that 
households are of fixed size, and that all members  of the household  die 
when the head dies.  We chose not to model the mortality of both 
spouses, to avoid an additional  state variable.42 
We calculate educational  group  population  weights from the Michi- 
gan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and replicate the as- 
sumption  of Engen, Gale, and Scholz that these weights are approxi- 
mately 0.25 for high school dropouts,  0.50 for high school graduates, 
and 0.25 for college graduates. 
LABOR AND  PENSION INCOME. We define income as pretax nonasset 
income. We include labor income and transfers  such as aid to families 
with dependent  children, supplemental  security  income, workers'  com- 
pensation, and unemployment  insurance. Our definition is therefore 
broader  than that of Engen and Gale, who use only labor earnings, or 
that of Hubbard,  Skinner, and Zeldes, who add only unemployment 
insurance  payments  to labor income.43 
The sample  of households  is taken  from  the PSID. We use the family 
files for the interview years between 1980 and 1992. We exclude all 
households where the head is younger than twenty years of age, that 
report  annual  income of less than $1,000 (in 1990 dollars, deflated  by 
the Consumer  Price  Index  for urban  consumers),  or that  have any  crucial 
variable missing.44  To calculate preretirement  income, we follow the 
approach  of Bernheim, Skinner, and Steven Weinberg, who define a 
year as preretirement  if any household member  works 1,500 hours or 
more in that or any subsequent year.45  A household is retired if no 
42.  Our approach  engenders  two subtle biases in opposite directions. On the one 
hand, it may yield too much simulated  retirement  saving, because the model implicitly 
rules  out insurance  effects that  arise  when spouses  have independent  mortality  outcomes; 
an n-person  marriage  creates  a partial  annuity  that  becomes  perfect  as n goes to infinity. 
On the other hand, our mortality  assumption  may imply too little simulated  retirement 
saving, because widows and widowers have expenses that fell by less than 50 percent 
when their spouses died. 
43.  Engen and Gale (1993); Hubbard,  Skinner,  and Zeldes (1994, 1995). 
44.  We believe that  reported  income of less than  $1,000 is likely to reflect  a coding 
or reporting  error.  Recall  that  by our definition,  income  includes  all government  transfers. 
45.  Bernheim,  Skinner, and Weinberg  (1997). 110  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
member  works more than 500 hours in the current  year or in any year 
in the future.46 
We estimate  the regression  equation 
(9)  yit =  al  (FS)it +  (1, age, age2, age3) 0t2  +  oL3 (TE)it 
+  (cohort  dummies)  oc, +  jti 
by weighted least squares, using the PSID population weights. We 
estimate  the equation  twice, once for households  in the labor  force and 
once for retired households. Log income of individual i at time t is 
determined  by a family size effect (FS)it, a polynomial in age, a time 
effect (TE)it,  and a cohort  effect. We specify the polynomial as a cubic 
for the preretirement  regression  and  linear  for the postretirement  regres- 
sion. Following Pierre-Olivier  Gourinchas  and  Jonathan  Parker,  and  to 
circumvent the problem that age, time, and birth year are perfectly 
correlated, we assume that the time effect is related to the business 
cycle  and can be proxied by the unemployment  rate.47  We use the 
unemployment  rate in the household's state of residence, taken from 
the worldwide web page of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. Our cohort 
effects control for birth year, to account for permanent  differences in 
productivity  that affect cohorts in different ways.48  We use five-year 
age cohorts, the oldest born in the period 1910-14  and the youngest 
born in 1970-74.  Table 1 reports  the income regressions  for each ed- 
ucational  group. 
We calculatefw  andf -the  polynomials  in the model of the previous 
section-by  setting the cohort, family size, and unemployment  effects 
equal to the sample means. This allows us to recover the age-specific 
effect for a household  that  has a constant  size, experiences  no business 
cycle effects,  and has a constant cohort effect over the life cycle.49 
Figure 2 plots the exponentiated  values off'  andfR  for the three edu- 
cational categories. 
To study the stochastic component  of preretirement  nonasset  house- 
46.  Household-years  that meet neither of these conditions are dropped  from the 
regression  analysis. 
47.  Gourinchas  and Parker  (1997). 
48.  See Attanasio  and Weber  (1993) for a discussion of cohort  effects. 
49.  Our  model precludes  variation  in household  size over the life cycle. If we were 
to include  family size effects, the simulations  would  generate  lower saving  among  young 
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Table 1. Estimated  Age-Income  Profiles  from Regressionsa 
Independent  High school  High school  College 
variable  dropouts  graduates  graduates 
Labor  force householdsb 
Age  0.059  0.058  0.224 
(0.033)  (0.018)  (0.026) 
Age2/100  -0.034  -0.017  -0.388 
(0.079)  (0.044)  (0.061) 
Age3/10,000  -0.030  -0.055  0.211 
(0.061)  (0.034)  (0.045) 
Other  effectsc  8.557  8.835  6.776 
Retired  householdsd 
Age  - 0.007  -0.008  -0.034 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Other  effectsc  9.673  10.158  12.399 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),  1980-92. 
a. Dependent variable is the natural log of nonasset household income.  Panel spans 1980-92.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
b. A household is in the labor force if any member works 1,500 hours in the current year or in any future year. 
c.  Includes a constant plus the effects  of cohort dummies, family size,  and the unemployment rate in the household's 
state of residence, evaluated with each regressor set equal to its sample mean. 
d. A household is retired if no member works more than 500 hours in the current year or in any future year. 
hold income, we exploit the panel dimension of the PSID. We model 
the unexplained  part of  measured nonasset  income  (tit)  as the sum of 
an individual  fixed effect, a first  order  autoregressive  process (ytD,  and 
a purely  transitory  shock (vit), which represents  measurement  error: 




+  Eiw  +  Vit. 
The individual  fixed effect is included  to account  for permanent  differ- 
ences in income that are not completely captured  by the educational 
categories, such as differences in human  capital and earning  ability. It 
is necessary  to include the individual  effect in this equation  to correctly 
estimate the persistence  of income shocks. However, we set it equal to 
zero in our actual simulations. This latter  decision is dictated  by com- 
putational  considerations,  since our problem  is not scalable and would 
have to be solved for every value of the fixed effect. 
Let o2  be the variance of the transitory  shock v, and let  U2 be the 
variance  of EW. Also, let Covk-  E(AttAttk)  represent  the theoretical 
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Figure  2. Estimated  Age-Income  Profilesa 
Income  (thousands  of 1990  dollars) 
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Source:  See table 1. 
a. Figuire  plots estimated  nonasset household income, by age and  educational  groLIp. Values are calculated  from a regression  of 
the natural  log of income on a cubic polynomial in age, cohort dummies, family size, and the unemployment  rate in the houise- 
hold's state of residence.  Figure  plots age effects, with other regressors  set equal to their means. See table I for details. 
Covo  =  2cr2 /(1  +  ot)  +  2ur2 
Covy  =  -  2  (I  -  ca)/(I  +  ct)  -  U2 
COVd  =  -  4/(1  +  4). 
We estimate the parameters  cr2,  cr2,  and oa  using weighted general- 
ized method  of moments  (GMM), minimizing  the distance  between the 
theoretical and empirical first twelve autocovariances.  The estimated 
parameters  are presented  in table 2. Because we include an individual 
fixed effect (and possibly also because of the different definition of 
income), these estimated  processes are much less persistent  than those 
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Table  2. Estimated  Age-Income  Process Parameters  for Households  in the Labor 
Forcea 
High school  High school  College 
Parameter  dropouts  graduates  graduates 
at  0.511  0.688  0.686 
(0.013)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Variance  of e  0.073  0.052  0.059 
(0.012)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Variance  of v  0.043  0.024  0.013 
(0.008)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the PSID,  1980-92. 
a.  A  household  is  in the  labor force  if  any  member works  1,500  hours in the current year or in any future year. 
Characteristics are from the following  panel regression model: 
y j, =  oq(FS)it +  (1, age, age2, age3) a2  +  0(3  (TE)i, +  (cohort dummies) a4  +  it 
ti,  =  ti  +  Uit +  uit =  ?i +  aU  ,t-i  +  uj,,, 
where yi, is the natural log of nonasset income of household i in year t, (FS)i, is a family size effect,  (TE)it is a time effect 
given by the unemployment rate in the household's  home state, and (jt is a disturbance term. The coefficient ox  and the 
variances of e and v are estimated using the generalized method of moments. Standard  errors are in parentheses. 
than that used  by Engen,  Gale,  and Scholz.50  To calibrate  the  stochastic 
component  of  postretirement  income,  we  set  U2  =  0.05,  a value  some- 
what lower than  that  of U2  .  Most authors  do not assume any stochastic 
component  in pension income. We do so for technical  reasons:  income 
uncertainty  reduces  behavioral  pathologies-such  as nonmonotonicities 
5 1  and discontinuities  in the consumption  function-in  dynamic  games. 
To calculate  the typical  retirement  age by educational  group,  we look 
at PSID households  that  experienced  the transition  to retirement  during 
the sample period. We record the age of each household head in the 
last year when any member of the household worked more than 500 
hours. We then calculate  the mean  of these retirement  ages within each 
educational  group.  Finally, we assume  that  each of the simulated  house- 
holds retires at the mean age for its respective educational  group. For 
households whose head did not graduate  from high school, the simu- 
lated retirement  age is sixty-one; for those with high school graduate 
and college graduate  heads, the mean ages are sixty-three and sixty- 
five, respectively. 
Given our income estimates, the implicit mean replacement  rates at 
retirement  are 41 percent for the low-education  group, 45 percent for 
high school graduates,  and 55 percent  for college graduates  (or relative 
to the average of the highest three years' earnings while in the labor 
50.  Hubbard,  Skinner,  and Zeldes (1994); Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994). 
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force, 38 percent, 38 percent, and 47 percent, respectively). The re- 
placement rates at retirement are therefore higher for the college- 
educated  group, contrary  to the calibration  of Engen, Gale, and  Scholz. 
However, since real retirement  income falls faster for this group, the 
ratio of average retirement  income to the average of the highest three 
years' earnings is smaller for highly educated  households: 31 percent 
compared  with 41 percent  for the other educational  categories. 
BEQUESTS.  To estimate the age distribution  of inheritances,  we use 
data  from the 1984 PSID. In that  year, respondents  were asked  whether 
they had received a bequest during the past five years. However, the 
PSID does not contain information  on the source of bequests. In order 
to correct for intrahousehold  bequests, we set to zero the inheritances 
received  by households  for which the marital  status  of the head  changed 
from married  to widowed over the previous seven years.52 
We run a probit regression to estimate age-dependent  probabilities 
of receiving a bequest. The independent  variables are a third degree 
polynomial in age, a constant, and two educational  dummy  variables. 
We assume that the age polynomial is the same for each of the three 
educational  groups, but allow for different  means. We do not estimate 
a separate  regression  for each group, because there are very few obser- 
vations for some groups at certain ages. The regression results are 
reported in table 3,  and the probabilities of receiving a bequest are 
plotted  in figure  3. Our  estimation  procedure  yields the expected  hump- 
shaped  pattern  of bequests, but the peak  probabilities  occur  at age sixty- 
seven, suggesting that the parents  of these recipients  die in their nine- 
ties. This puzzle is mitigated  by the fact that, in general, bequests are 
not received until both parents  have died. 
We also estimate the age profile of bequest  magnitudes  (conditional 
on having received a bequest). To do so,  we restrict the sample to 
households with positive bequests. We estimate a regression for the 
natural  logarithm  of bequests  on education  dummies  and a third  degree 
polynomial  in age. Figure  4 plots the exponentiation  of this polynomial, 
and table 3 also reports  the associated  regression  results, including  the 
estimated  variance  of the disturbance  term that is used to calibrate  cr2. 
The bequest magnitudes  show a sharp  rise late in life, which is driven 
52.  Note that this method eliminates spousal bequests irrespective  of whether  the 
decedent  was formerly  the head  of the household.  The correction  eliminates  sixty of the 
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Table  3. Estimated  Age-Bequest  Profiles  from Regressions 
Dependent  variable 
Independent  Probability  of  Log size of 
variable  bequesta  bequestb 
Age  -0.056  0.379 
(0.058)  (0.195) 
Age2/100  0.176  -0.673 
(0.124)  (0.415) 
Age3/10,000  -0.134  0.393 
(0.084)  (0.280) 
Dummy  variables 
High school dropout  -0.698  2.217 
(0.091)  (2.893) 
High school graduate  - 0.375  2.737 
(0.071)  (2.875) 
College graduate  2.939 
(2.872) 
Constant  -0.845 
(0.852) 
Summary  statistic 
Variance  of error  term  0.09 
Source: Authors' calculations based on data from the PSID,  1984. 
a. Coefficients from a probit model. Dependent variable is equal to I if the household received at least one bequest during 
1980-84,  and to zero otherwise. Spousal bequests are excluded.  Standard  errors are in parentheses. 
b. Dependent variable is the natural log of bequests received by the household during 1980-84.  Panel is restricted to 
observations in which a positive bequest occurs. Households whose head is older than eighty years and spotisal bequests are 
excluded.  Standard  errors are in parentheses. 
by the actual reported bequests of the elderly and is not due to an 
endpoint  polynomial effect.53 
TAXES.  We assume  a progressive  tax structure  with marginal  tax rates 
of 15 percent  for income up to $41,200; 28 percent  for income between 
$41,200 and $99,600; and 31 percent  for income above $99,600. We 
also allow for a standard  deduction  of $6,900 and  a personal  exemption 
of $2,650.  Contributions  to the DC pension are tax-deductible, and 
withdrawals  are taxed at the relevant  marginal  tax rate. This structure 
mimics the 1997 federal tax rates for married  couples filing jointly, 
53.  We restrict  our bequest  magnitude  regression  to households  whose head is aged 
eighty or younger, and then extrapolate  the curve out through  age ninety. When  we ran 
the regression for the complete population, the rapid rise in the bequest magnitude 
function late in life was even more dramatic.  There is a small number  of very old 
households  that  report  receiving very large bequests. 116  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Figure  3. Estimated  Probability  of Receiving  a Bequest,  by Agea 
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on ai  cubic polynomiiial  in age anid  edLicational  dumimiies:  see table 3 for details. 
except that we excluded the 36 percent  and 39.6 percent  tax brackets, 
since almost none of our simulated  consumers  receives enough income 
to qualify for these higher  brackets.54 
ASSETS AND  THE DYNAMIC BUDGET CONSTRAINT. We set the value of 
the pretax  real interest  rate equal to 5 percent, consistent with Engen, 
Gale, and Scholz. Further,  we assume  that  employers  match  50 percent 
of DC plan contributions  up to the first 6 percent  of pay (that is, 4 = 
0.5, 4'  =  0.06). This is by far the most common  matching  arrangement 
for 401(k) plans, and is reported  by 21 percent  of the firms  in a survey 
54.  The 36 percent  bracket  starts  at an income level of $151,750. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  117 
Figure 4. Estimated  Age-Bequest  Profilesa 
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a. Figure  plots, by age and educational  group, the magnitude  ot bequests ieceived, conditional  on receiving a positive bequLest. 
Values  are calculated  fronm  a regression  of the natural  log of bequests  on a cuibic  polynomial in age and eduicational  diluinlies:  see 
table 3 for details. 
of such plans conducted  by Hewitt Associates.55  We also consider the 
no match case (that is, 4 =  0). 
Preference Parameters 
In this section we describe our choice of preference  parameters. 
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion 
We adopt  a utility function  with a constant  coefficient of relative  risk 
aversion. In the benchmark  calibration,  we set the coefficient  of relative 
55.  Hewitt Associates (1997). 118  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
risk aversion, p, equal to 1 (log utility). To support  this choice, we 
offer four observations.  First, estimation  procedures  that  do not require 
linearization or aggregation of the Euler equation have yielded esti- 
mated values below one for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Gourinchas  and Parker,  for example, report  a point estimate of 0.5.56 
Second, estimation procedures  that are based on first order lineari- 
zation of the Euler equation and focus on consumers  with high levels 
of liquid wealth-effectively  controlling  for second order  terms-have 
yielded values near 1 for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. For 
example, Zeldes runs  separate  analyses  for consumers  who are  liquidity 
constrained  and those who are not.57  Assuming that the second order 
terms in the Euler  equation  are small for the unconstrained  consumers, 
one can calculate estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
for those consumers: Zeldes's point estimates imply values that lie 
between 0.7 and 2.3. John  Shea also splits his sample into constrained 
and unconstrained  consumers, and his point estimates from the high- 
wealth consumers  imply values that lie between 0.2 and  0.4.58 Neither 
author's  results are estimated  with high precision, however.59 
Third, estimation procedures  that are based on linearization  of the 
Euler equation  but do not control for second order  terms yield highly 
mixed results.60  Fourth, such estimation procedures, which rely on 
variation  in the aftertax  interest  rate to measure  the elasticity of inter- 
temporal substitution, do not identify the value of the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion. This point has recently  been established  by Car- 
roll, who shows that  the response  of liquidity-constrained  consumers- 
56.  Gourinchas  and  Parker  (1997). Hansen  and  Singleton  (1982) use a GMM  frame- 
work  to estimate  p with aggregate  data. They report  point estimates  between  0.6 and 1, 
but we are skeptical  of the representative  agent methodology  that  they use. 
57.  Zeldes (1989). 
58.  Shea (1995). 
59.  We are skeptical of the analyses of Zeldes and Shea, because they identify 
variation in the interest rate by using marginal tax rates. This technique implicitly 
assumes  that  the aftertax  rate  of return  falls with income-a  hypothesis  that  our  account- 
ants do not accept. 
60.  Hall's (1988) results imply that the measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substi- 
tution  is probably  between  0 and  0.2. This finding  is supported  by Campbell  and  Mankiw 
(1989). But it is contradicted  by Mankiw, Rotemberg,  and Summers  (1985), who find 
that the measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  is greater  than unity, and by 
Beaudry  and van Wincoop  (1996), who find  that  it is equal  to unity. Note that  in a world 
of complete  markets,  the measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  is equal  to the 
inverse of the coefficient of relative  risk aversion. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  119 
for example, buffer stock consumers-to  changes in the interest rate 
will be muted, implying that the measured  elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution  will be less than the inverse of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion.61  We have confirmed  Carroll's finding and quantify  the 
effect in a life cycle context. With p equal  to 1, the measured  elasiticity 
of intertemporal  substitution  in our hyperbolic  model is 0.22, which is 
consistent  with the available  empirical  evidence. We return  to this result 
below, in describing  the properties  of our simulated  model. 
The coefficient of relative  risk aversion  governs  risk aversion, prud- 
ence, and the willingness of consumers  to substitute  consumption  in- 
tertemporally.  If p is relatively large, household saving decisions will 
be relatively insensitive to the introduction  of a tax-deferred  saving 
instrument  that raises the aftertax  rate of return.  Also, a higher p gen- 
erates more precautionary  savings for the same level of income uncer- 
tainty, increasing  the opportunities  for asset shifting. Hence the choice 
of this parameter  has important  implications for the efficacy of a DC 
plan. 
We also consider the case when p is equal to 3, both to demonstrate 
that our results are highly sensitive to the choice of p, and so that our 
results can be compared  with those of Engen, Gale, and Scholz. 
Time Preference  Parameter  ,B 
We simulate  below hyperbolic  economies and exponential  econom- 
ies. In doing so, we assume  that an economy is either  populated  exclu- 
sively by hyperbolic  consumers-with  ,3  equal to 0.85-or  exclusively 
by exponential  consumers-with  ,3 equal to 1. 
For the hyperbolic  simulations, we would have preferred  to have set 
,  much lower-approximately  equal to 0.6-as  Laibson has done in 
previous work on undersaving.62  Most of the experimental  evidence 
suggests that the one-year discount rate is at least 40 percent.63  How- 
ever, a value of 0.6 generates  pathologies in discrete  time simulations: 
strongly nonmonotonic and noncontinuous consumption functions. 
Such effects are commonplace  in dynamic games such as the intraper- 
sonal game that we consider.64  In our simulations, these pathologies 
61.  Carroll  (1997b). 
62.  Laibson  (1996). 
63.  See Ainslie (1992) for a review. 
64.  See Laibson  (1997b) for an analysis  of these effects. 120  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
vanish as ,3 approaches  unity. Specifically, we find that strong  pathol- 
ogies only arise  for values of ,  below 0.8, which motivates  our  decision 
to adopt a value of 0.85. 
It has recently been numerically shown that such pathologies are 
sensitive to the amount  of stochastic variation  in the income process: 
increasing  the income variation  drives out the pathologies.65  However, 
we choose not to pursue this "fix,"  since in our model the income 
processes are exogenously calibrated. 
It can also be shown that the discontinuities  vanish if the model is 
implemented  in continuous  time.66  Hence the discrete time framework 
that we use implicitly limits the range of the parameter  space that can 
be used to generate  sensible results. Nevertheless, it is possible to get 
some idea of how the model would perform  if the value of ,3  were below 
0.85.  Specifically, one can rerun  the simulations  for values of ,3 in the 
neighborhood  of 0.85-say  0.8-and  use the local change in results to 
estimate the effect of much lower values. We pursue  this extrapolation 
exercise below and find that the hyperbolic effects increase approxi- 
mately linearly in the gap between ,3 and 1. 
Time Preference  Parameter  8 
Having fixed all of the other parameters,  we are left with three free 
parameters in the hyperbolic  economy  NHps,ol,  KHS  o  8COLL, 
and three free  parameters in  the  exponential economy-_'NxHpSZ,eZ,t 
aexponential9  eixpo7iential  The superscripts  NHS, HS, and COLL represent  the 
three educational  categories, did not graduate  from high school, high 
school graduate,  and college graduate,  respectively. We pick values of 
8 so that  our simulations  replicate  actual  levels of preretirement  wealth 
holding, according  to data taken  from the Federal  Reserve's Survey of 
Consumer  Finances (SCF) for 1983. Specifically, we pick 8 such that 
the simulated  median  ratio  of wealth  to income for individuals  between 
the ages of fifty and fifty-nine matches  the actual median  in the data. 
Although IRAs and 401(k)s were introduced  in the 1970s-in  1974 
and 1978, respectively-their  use was not initially widespread.  Eligi- 
bility for IRAs was made universal in 1982, and only 13.3 percent  of 
households  with at least one employed  member were eligible  for 
65.  See Laibson  (1997b). 
66.  At least in theory, the nonmonotonicities  may persist. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  121 
Table  4. Calibrated  Long-Term  Discount Ratesa 
Rate 
Exponential  consumers  Hyperbolic  consumers 
Education  CRRA  = J b  CRRA  = 3b  CRRA  = lb  CRRA  = 3b 
High school dropouts  0.0490  0.0870  0.0360  0.0745 
High school graduates  0.0385  0.0590  0.0275  0.0485 
College graduates  0.0305  0.0395  0.0205  0.0295 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
a. Table reports  the long-term discount rates (I -  8) generated by the authors' calibration exercise. Rates exclude mortality 
effects. 
b. CRRA denotes coefficient of relative risk aversion in this and following  tables and figures, as applicable. 
401(k)s in 1984.67 We therefore  take the 1983 data  as an approximation 
of a no DC plan steady state. We simulate a no DC plan economy and 
search  for the values of 8 that  match  the 1983 accumulation  levels. We 
then use the same values of 8 for the DC plan simulations. We choose 
to calibrate  consumer  preferences  by matching  the characteristics  of a 
no DC plan steady state, because the U.S. economy is still in transition 
from the no DC plan steady state to the DC plan steady state. 
In the 1983 SCF, the median ratio of net wealth to income is 1.83 
for households  whose head did not graduate  from high school, 2.66 for 
households whose head's highest educational attainment is  a high 
school diploma, and 3.59  for households whose head has a college 
degree.68  The discount rates (1  -  8) that replicate these wealth-to- 
income ratios are reported  in table 4. Four  properties  stand  out. First, 
these discount rates fall with educational  attainment.  Since the shape 
of the labor  income profile  is roughly  similar  across  educational  groups, 
a relatively low discount rate is needed to replicate  the relatively high 
wealth-to-income  ratio of the highly educated. Second, the discount 
rates rise with the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Since precau- 
tionary saving rises with the coefficient of relative risk aversion, an 
increase in the discount rate is  needed to offset an increase in the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Third, the discount rates for hy- 
perbolic consumers are lower than those for exponential consumers. 
Since hyperbolic  consumers  have two sources of discounting, ,3  and 8, 
67.  See Poterba,  Venti, and Wise (1995). They consider the population  of house- 
holds whose head is aged between twenty-five and sixty-five, where at least one em- 
ployed member  of the household  is not self-employed. 
68.  Our definition  of net worth includes liquid assets and illiquid assets; for more 
details, see text below. 122  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
the hyperbolic  8's must be higher than  the exponential  8's. Recall that 
the hyperbolic  and  exponential  discount  functions  are  calibrated  to gen- 
erate the same amount of preretirement  wealth accumulation.  In this 
manner,  we "equalize" the underlying  willingness to save of the ex- 
ponential and the hyperbolic consumers  before we introduce  the DC 
plan. Fourth,  all of the calibrated  long-term  discount  rates  are sensible, 
falling between 0.02 and  0.09. Note, however, that  they do not include 
mortality  effects, which add roughly another  0.01,  generating  net dis- 
count rates. 
Our calibration  of preference  parameters  can be compared  with that 
of Engen, Gale, and Scholz. These authors  do not adopt different  dis- 
count factors  for households  with different  levels of educational  attain- 
ment, but we compare our high school calibration  to their aggregate 
calibration  (recall that the high school group represents  half of U.S. 
households). For exponential  consumers  with p equal to 3, we adopt a 
high school discount rate of 0.059,  significantly larger than Engen, 
Gale, and Scholz's discount  rate  of 0.04. This difference  makes  the DC 
plan more  effective in our simulations,  since households  with relatively 
high discount  rates  have lower levels of accumulation  and  are  less likely 
to hit the DC plan contribution  caps, strengthening  the substitution 
effect. 
The Calibrated Economy without a Defined Contribution Plan 
In this section we analyze the properties  of our calibrated  economies 
without a DC plan, and all discussion pertains to these economies, 
unless otherwise noted. Our first finding is that the hyperbolic and 
exponential  economies are observationally  very similar. Figure 5 plots 
the average levels of consumption,  pretax  income, and asset accumu- 
lation of exponential, log utility consumers  in the high school graduate 
group. The corresponding  graphs  for the other educational  groups are 
qualitatively similar. Figure 6 plots the path of a single exponential 
consumer.  These figures  are similar  to their  hyperbolic  analogs, figures 
7 and 8; at first glance, it is hard to differentiate  between them. The 
only discernible  contrast  is that hyperbolic  consumers  hold less buffer 
stock wealth early in life than  do exponential  consumers.  Figure  9 plots 
the consumption  functions  of an exponential  consumer  and  a hyperbolic David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  123 
Figure 5. Simulated  Average  Liquid Asset, Income, and Consumption  Paths, 
Exponential  Householdsa 
Thousands  of 1990  dollars 
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Source:  Authors simulations. 
a. Figuire  plots  average  values  for households  with high school graduiate  head.  The coefficienit  of relative  risk  aversion  is equal  to 1. 
one. The rough similarity of these functions further  underscores  the 
difficulty of distinguishing  exponential  from hyperbolic  consumers.69 
Our calibrated  exponential and hyperbolic  economies replicate  em- 
pirical life-cycle patterns  documented  by other  authors.70  Consumption 
closely tracks  income, rising early in life and then falling, as "hump" 
saving accelerates in the two decades before retirement  (see figures 5 
and  7). Comovement  between consumption  and  income is also apparent 
at higher frequencies (see figures 6 and 8). These basic empirical  reg- 
69.  The hyperbolic  consumption  function  is nonmonotonic,  but this pathology  van- 
ishes as one increases the fineness of the partition  of the state space and increases the 
number  of states in the discrete  approximation  of the stochastic  income process. 
70.  See Carroll  (1992,  1997a); Gourinchas  and Parker  (1997); Hubbard,  Skinner, 
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Figure 6.  Simulated  Liquid Asset, Income,  and Consumption  Paths of 
One Exponential  Householda 
Thousands of 1990 dollars 
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Source:  Authors'  simulations. 
a. Figure  plots valuLes  for a household  with high school graduate  head.  The coeffcienit of ielative isk aversion  is equal to I. 
ularities are consistent with both the exponential and the hyperbolic 
versions of the buffer stock model. 
The exponential and hyperbolic  models also imply similar levels of 
sensitivity to interest  rate changes. Table 5 reports  the measured  elas- 
ticity of intertemporal  substitution  for both models. Conceptually, the 
measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  is the derivative 
d(Aln Ci,) 
dR 
The table reports  the average  value of this derivative  over the life cycle 
(weighted with survivorship  probabilities), in the neighborhood  of R 
equal to 1.05. Our  numbers  are equivalent  to running  an ordinary  least David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  125 
Figure 7.  Simulated  Average Liquid  Asset, Income,  and Consumption  Paths, 
Hyperbolic  Householdsa 
Thousands of 1990 dollars 
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Source:  Authors'  simulations. 
a. FigLure  plots averaige  values for households with high school graduate  heads. 
squares  regression  of Aln Cit  on a constant  and  the deterministic  interest 
rate.7' 
When p is equal to  1, the measured elasticities of  intertemporal 
substitution  are 0.27 for the exponential  model and  0.22 for the hyper- 
bolic model. When p is equal to 3, they fall to 0. 16 for the exponential 
model and 0. 15 for the hyperbolic  model. These values are well below 
the inverse of the coefficients of relative risk aversion, since, at least 
early in life, our households  make  choices in a buffer stock framework, 
implying that the slope of the consumption  path is initially determined 
71.  We obtain almost identical numbers  when we replace individual  consumption 
growth,  AlnCi,, with  the  growth rate of  average consumption within a  cohort, 
Aln(X Cj). 126  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Figure 8.  Simulated  Liquid Asset,  Income,  and Consumption  Paths of 
One Hyperbolic  Householda 
Thousands of  1990 dollars 
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Source:  Authors'  simulations. 
a. Figure  plots values for a household with high school graduate  head. 
partly by the slope of the income path, rather  than exclusively by the 
interest rate.72  As education increases-corresponding to a fall in the 
calibrated  discount  rates-the  measured  elasticity of intertemporal  sub- 
stitution rises. Patient households are less likely to be constrained  by 
their  income paths. Finally, although  the measured  hyperbolic  elasticity 
of intertemporal  substitution  is close to the measured  exponential  elas- 
ticity of intertemporal  substitution,  the former  is slightly smaller. This 
systematic gap reflects the fact that hyperbolic agents are much more 
likely to hit binding liquidity constraints. 
In the body of this section we discuss two features  of our simulations 
that distinguish the hyperbolic model from its exponential  precursors: 
72.  See Carroll  (1997b). David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  127 
Figure 9.  Consumption  Functions  of Exponential  and Hyperbolic  Householdsa 
Consumption  (thousands  of 1990  dollars) 
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a. Figure plots consumption functions for exponential and hyperbolic households with median income amiiong  households 
whose heads are aged twenty and are high school graduates. 
b. Includes  liquid  savings and  current  disposable inconie. 
Table  5. Average  Elasticities  of Intertemporal  Substitutiona 
Exponential consumers  Hyperbolic consumers 
Education  CRRA  = I  CRRA  = 3  CRRA  = I  CRRA  = 3 
High school dropouts  0.18  0.12  0.15  0.12 
High school graduates  0.25  0.16  0.20  0.15 
College graduates  0.40  0.18  0.31  0.16 
Weighted  averageb  0.27  0.16  0.22  0.15 
Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. Conceptually, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is measured as the derivative 
d(Aln Cit) 
dR 
where Cit is consumption of individual i at age t,  and R  =  I  +  r is the gross interest rate. Table reports the observed 
average value of this derivative over the life cycle  of simulated individuals in three educational groups (weighting with 
survivorship probabilities), in the neighborhood of R  =  1.05. 
b. Uses population weights. 128  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
binding liquidity constraints  and missing precautionary  saving effects. 
Before discussing these phenomena,  we introduce  an analytic  tool that 
provides the intuition  for our analysis. 
The Generalized  Euler Equation 
We present  an heuristic  derivation  of a marginal  condition  that  char- 
acterizes the equilibrium  path of the hyperbolic  economy.73  The heu- 
ristic derivation is based on a classical perturbation  argument. The 
marginal  benefit  of postponing  A >  0 units of consumption  generates  a 
stream  of utility perturbations  from the perspective  of self t. At time t, 
Au' (C) 
utils are lost. Self t expects to gain 
Et [13  ct+jI  RAu'(Ct+1)j 
utils at time t +  1, assuming that the hazard  rate of survival is unity, 
to reduce notation. Note that ax  is the marginal  consumption  rate at 
at+j 
period t + j.  Self t expects to gain 
E  [382  (act+2  (1  act+  I 
R2AP(C\l  t  axt+  2  axt+  I! 
C  u~+2;j 
utils at time t +  2; and so on. The net effect sums to 
a__  ac  * 
(10)  -Au' (C) + Et  (8  (+  I  [  l  RiAu'(Ct+])J. 
Setting this expression less than or equal to zero and dividing by A 
yields an Euler equation: 
(T+Nt  E  (8X  )  ac 
a+i  Hi 
1- 
t+j  t+  (11)  u'(C~)?  Li,  6' ~ax/  ~  \L  R 
73.  See Laibson (1996) for an earlier incarnation  of this heuristic argument,  and 
Laibson (1997b) for numerical  confirmation  that the Euler equation  does in fact char- 
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One could repeat  this argument  for A <  0 (assuming that the agent is 
never perfectly liquidity constrained),  which would enable one to sub- 
stitute an equality for the inequality  in equation 11. Consider  the anal- 
ogous Euler equation  for period t +  1: 
(12)  u'(Ct+l)  = 
I  T+N-(t+1)  (  ac  \ [-  I  ac 







axt+  I+J LUj1  kj 
axt+  I+)j  R'  C+)J 
Application  of the law of iterated  expectations  and substitution  of equa- 
tion 12 in equation 11 yields 
(13)  u'(Ct) 
E  (act+  I  (Xt+ )) 18 + (1  Cc+I  (Xt+  ,)  8 Ru'(Ct  )  ax,  /  ax~+ 
which Laibson  refers to elsewhere as the generalized  Euler  equation.74 
Note that equation 13 is identical to a standard  Euler equation, except 
that  the term  in square  brackets  replaces  the constant  discount  factor  of 
the classical equation. The discounting term in the generalized Euler 
equation, 
(14)  [(  aCt+1(Xt+1)  X  +  (1  -  aC+ 
L  A  I  Ax+,  I] 
is stochastic  and varies linearly  with next period's marginal  propensity 
to consume. When 1 is equal to 1, this bracketed  term is equal to 8- 
the standard  exponential  discounting  case. When 1 is less than 1, this 
bracketed  term  is a weighted average  of the one-period  discount  factor, 
136,  and the discount factor that applies in all future periods, 6. The 
respective weights are tomorrow's  marginal  propensity  to consume, 
(  ItXt+l)  , and (1-  t+Xt+l) 
Ax+,  I  Ax+  1I 
74.  Laibson  (1996). 130  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
To interpret  equation 13 and the time-varying stochastic discount 
factor, it is helpful to consider  the polar  cases of marginal  propensities 
to consume equal to one and to zero. First, consider a consumer  who 
is certain  to be liquidity constrained  next period;  that is, C, 1 =  X,  , 
implying a marginal  propensity  to consume of unity. In this scenario, 
any savings set aside at time t will be spent in period t +  1, implying 
that self t effectively faces a two-period  game. The Euler  equation  that 
characterizes  self t's equilibrium  action can be expressed as 
(15)  u'(Ct)  :': Et[Rpbu'(Ct+l)], 
where the hazard  rate of survival, st, has again been set to unity, to 
simplify notation. Equation 15 holds with equality when savings are 
positive at time t. This equation  can be derived directly with a simple 
perturbation  argument. Self  t can use a marginal dollar to generate 
u'(Ct) utils at time t or Et[Ru'(Ct+ 1)] expected  utils at time t  +  1. The 
utils at time t +  1 must  be discounted,  yielding the final  equation.  Note 
that equation 15 implies a great deal of impatience. The one-period 
discount factor is 18,  implying a discount rate of roughly 20 percent, 
given our calibration  values. 
Now consider the case of a zero marginal  propensity  to consume. 
The generalized  Euler equation  reduces to 
u'(Ct) '  Et[R8u?(Ct+,)], 
which is identical to the classical Euler equation for a model with a 
discount factor of 8.  The intuition behind this case is less  straight- 
forward  and is best understood  by considering  the general  properties  of 
the  intrapersonal  strategic  conflict  that arises  with  hyperbolic 
preferences. 
From  the perspective  of self t, marginal  utility in period  t +  1 is too 
low relative to marginal  utility during subsequent  periods: self t +  1 
"underweights" the future by factor 1. Self t would like to transfer 
resources to those future  periods after t +  1. When the marginal  pro- 
pensity to consume of self t  +  1 falls (holding all else equal), such 
transfers  can be made more efficiently. Hence a low marginal  propen- 
sity to consume in period t +  1 is associated with less consumption  at 
time t. As the marginal  propensity  to consume in period t +  1 goes to 
zero, this transfer  effect perfectly offsets the effect of 1 less than 1, 
recovering  the classical Euler equation. David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  131 
For intermediate  values of the marginal  propensity  to consume, the 
relevant  endogenous  discount  factor  is a weighted average  of 18 and 8, 
where the relevant  weights are 
(  t+I(  t+l)  and  -1  -  t+I(  t+l) 
At+ I  At+ I 
Consumers  will exhibit a great deal of endogenous heterogeneity in 
implicit patience levels over the life cycle. For consumers  in our high 
school graduate  group  with coefficient of relative  risk aversion  equal to 
1, endogenous  discount factors vary from 18 equal to 0.8266 (0.85  x 
0.9725)  to 8 equal to 0.9725.  The range of variation  would be even 
more dramatic  if we had adopted  a lower value for 1. 
This wide range of discount factors implies that hyperbolic agents 
occasionally behave very impatiently-and  in doing so, are likely to 
meet binding liquidity constraints-while  at other times they demon- 
strate  a willingness to accumulate  large stocks of wealth. In this frame- 
work, low levels of cash on hand are self-reinforcing:  they imply a 
higher expected marginal  propensity to consume (since consumption 
functions in buffer stock models are concave), which, in turn, lowers 
the endogenous discount factor.75  Hence, hyperbolic consumers with 
low levels of cash on hand tend to act like consumers  with extremely 
high discount rates, increasing the likelihood that their liquidity con- 
straints  will turn  out to be binding. 
An alternative  way to see these effects is to compare  the consumption 
functions of exponential and hyperbolic agents. As can be seen from 
figure 9, hyperbolic  agents are relatively more impatient  at low levels 
of wealth holding-in  this region the hyperbolic  consumption  function 
lies above the exponential function-and  conversely, more patient at 
high levels of wealth holding. In summary, at low levels of wealth, 
hyperbolic consumers  act like exponential consumers with low levels 
of patience. At high levels of wealth, hyperbolic consumers act like 
exponential consumers  with high levels of patience. 
75.  For a proof that consumption  functions are concave when consumers  have ex- 
ponential  discount  functions, see Carroll  and  Kimball  (1996). Their  proof  does not carry 
over to the hyperbolic  case. Nevertheless,  in hyperbolic  models, consumption  functions 
are approximately  concave; see figure  9. 132  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
Binding Liquidity Constraints 
Although we choose our calibration  values so that exponential and 
hyperbolic consumers  accumulate  the same median level of preretire- 
ment assets, our results show that the hyperbolic  consumers  are much 
more likely to find themselves close to or at binding liquidity con- 
straints. Figures 10 to  12 graph the percentage of exponential and 
hyperbolic  households  that  are  effectively liquidity  constrained:  that  is, 
for households whose head did not graduate  from high school, asset 
holdings  of less than  $250; for households  whose head  has a high school 
diploma only,  asset holdings of less than $400; and for households 
whose head graduated  from college, asset holdings of less than  $500.76 
We show results for coefficient of relative risk aversion  equal to 1 and 
equal to 3. In all cases, the hyperbolic  percentages  lie well above the 
exponential percentages. Consider the first panel of figure 11, which 
plots the results for households  in the high school graduate  group with 
a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 1. At age thirty-five, 40 
percent of the hyperbolic consumers have less than $400 in wealth, 
compared  with only 21 percent  of exponential  consumers. 
It is useful to compare  these results  with the percentages  of liquidity- 
constrained  consumers  reported  in the Survey of Consumer  Finances. 
This exercise is not straightforward,  however, since the SCF data are 
not directly comparable with the output from our simulations. Our 
timing assumption, equation 5,  implies that a consumer who always 
sets annual consumption equal to annual aftertax income (and never 
receives a bequest), will never have any positive asset holdings. 
In the real world, by contrast,  income is received at discrete  intervals 
and  consumption  is implemented  continuously.  If workers  are  paid  once 
a month, a consumer  who spends all of his aftertax  income will have 
average  wealth  holdings  of two weeks of income. If this consumer  saves 
part  of his income for a major  expenditure  (for example, a vacation  or 
Christmas  gifts), his average  holdings will be even greater.  We adjust 
76.  Our cutoff of $250 for households whose heads did not graduate  from high 
school reflects the fact that in our simulations,  households  are constrained  to lie on an 
asset grid. Since the grid  for this educational  group  takes  values {$0, $500, $1000,.  . .}, 
we think  of all consumers  at 0 as having  less than  $250 dollars  in assets. The analogous 
grids for households  in the high school graduate  and college graduate  groups increase 
in increments  of $800 and $1,000, respectively. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  133 
Figure 10. Share of High School Dropouts  Who Are Liquidity  Constrained,  by Agea 
Percent  of households 
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Figure  11.  Share of High School  Graduates  Who Are Liquidity  Constrained,  by Agea 
Percent  of households 
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Figure 12. Share of College Graduates  Who Are Liquidity  Constrained,  by Agea 
Percent  of households 
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the SCF data to remove such intrayear  savings. In tables 6 to 8 we 
report  the percentage  of households  that  are liquidity  constrained-that 
is, households  that  hold assets valued  below n weeks of aftertax  income, 
where n -  1, 2, 3, 4. 
Another question that arises when comparing  our results with the 
SCF data is whether  a constrained  consumer  is one with low net worth 
or one with low liquid assets. Our  definition  of net worth  includes  liquid 
assets-checking  accounts, savings accounts, money market  accounts, 
call accounts, certificates  of deposit, bonds, stocks, mutual  funds, and 
cash, less credit card debt-and  illiquid assets-IRAs,  DC pension 
plans, life insurance, trusts, annuities, vehicles, home equity, real es- 
tate, business equity, jewelry, furniture,  antiques, and home durables, 
less education  loans. Few of these illiquid assets can  be used to generate 
immediate  liquidity without  incurring  substantial  transaction  costs. In- 
deed, many have commitment properties, which would make them 
appealing  to hyperbolic  consumers  who do not want  easy access to their 
money. We believe that a consumer  may face an economically mean- 
ingful liquidity constraint  even if he or she has many of the illiquid 
assets listed above. 
Figures 10 to 12 also plot the percentage of liquidity-constrained 
consumers  from the SCF (using the liquid asset data  from the sixth row 
of tables 6 to 8). In each case, the percentage  of liquidity-constrained 
consumers tends to lie above both simulation lines,  but the hyper- 
bolic line is closer to the actual data than the exponential line. When 
p is equal to 1, the hyperbolic line generally lies slightly below the 
actual data. When p is equal to 3, both the hyperbolic and exponential 
lines fall well below the actual data, although the hyperbolic line is 
closer. 
These results are only suggestive, however, since the simulated  per- 
centages of liquidity-constrained  consumers  are downward  biased (for 
both exponential and hyperbolic cases).  Our benchmark  simulations 
assume that there is only one asset and that it is liquid. Since illiquid 
and liquid assets are partial substitutes, our simulations bias upward 
the accumulation  of liquid assets for both hyperbolic and exponential 
consumers. Future  work should evaluate the simulated percentage  of 
liquidity-constrained  consumers  in an economy with both liquid assets 
and illiquid assets such as real estate and durables. rz  kf  O  k  ?  t)  r-  Ct\  ??N 
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Precautionary  Saving 
Since Robert  Hall's original work in the late 1970s, it has become 
standard  practice to work with Taylor expansions of the Euler equa- 
tion.77  The current  consensus  calls for second order  terms  to be included 
in the approximation.  We undertake  such analysis  on the data  generated 
by the exponential and the hyperbolic simulations. Specifically, we 
estimate the second order  equation 
(16)  (Ct+  I  c)  I 
I-  +,p +  ;E  Ct  c)2  +  ,. 
(  C,  R8)  2  [(  C,  )  A 
Dynan derives this equation  from the classical Euler  equation  (  =  1), 
by expanding C,+1 around Ct.78 She finds that the estimates of  p- 
imputed from the coefficient on the conditional variance term-are 
negative, and hence anomalously  low. We show that the direction of 
the bias in Dynan's findings  is predicted  by the generalized  Euler  equa- 
tion. We then estimate Dynan's equation  with our simulated  data. 
A second order  Taylor expansion of the generalized  Euler equation 
yields 




I  )E,tact+ (Xt-1)  +  0(2)  +  Et+l, 
p  Rb  AX+  I 
where ct+  I(X  t+ 1)  has been expanded  around  zero, and 0(2)  has been 
substituted  for second order  terms (including the one in equation 16). 
The first order  expression 1  1)E,(  act+(Xt+)  which appears 
R  -  axt+ I' 
in equation 17, vanishes in the exponential  case (,B  =  1). In the hyper- 
bolic case, this new first order term is easy to interpret.  Recall that 
when the marginal  propensity  to consume is expected to be high next 
77.  Hall (1978). 
78.  Dynan  (1993). David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  141 
period, the discount  factor  in the generalized  Euler  equation  falls, pull- 
ing down the expected slope of the consumption  path. 
Estimates  of p inferred  from regression analysis of equation 16 will 
be affected by omitted variable bias when ,B  is less than 1. Assum- 
ing that first order omitted variables dominate second order omitted 
variables, the direction of  this bias is  given by the covariation of 
2  an~~~~~~2  P2 Et[(  '+'C  -  1) E: 
aXt+  I). 
To sign this 
covariation,  note that  the conditional  variability  of consumption  growth 
is high when the buffer stock of assets is low, and low assets imply a 
high marginal propensity to consume (see figure 10). Finally, recall 
that (13 -  1) is less than zero, implying that the covariation  between 
p+  1 Et [(Ct  c)1  and  (  -  1) Et  AXt'(Xt+')  is negative. 
Omitted  variable bias implies that estimates of equation 16 will yield 
p+1 
low or even negative estimates  of  , 
+ 
as Dynan  finds  using data  from 
2 
the Consumer  Expenditure  Survey of the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics. 
We confirm  these intuitions  with our simulated  data  through  regres- 
sion analysis  of equation  16. We operationalize  this regression  by using 
instrumental  variables  to estimate 
(18)  (Ct+-  C,) =  -  +  O  (Ct+,-C,)  + e,E 
To instrument  for (C+  I'  c'),  we follow Dynan and use education 
dummies and gross savings at time t.79  Table 9 reports the resulting 
inferred  values of p using data  from the exponential  and the hyperbolic 
simulations, for both p equal to 1 and p equal to 3. 
The findings reported  in table 9 confirm  that the anomaly reported 
by Dynan is predicted  by the hyperbolic  model. First, in every case the 
imputed  value of p is lower in the regression  using hyperbolic  simulated 
data  than  in the regression  using analogous  exponential  data.  Moreover, 
79.  Dynan  also uses education,  occupation,  and  number  of earners  in the household, 
but she omits education  and occupation  for some of her estimates. 'IC 
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in every case the exponential data yield an imputed  value of p above 
the true value, presumably  a bias generated  by the second order ap- 
proximation  in the derivation  of the linearized  Euler  equation;  while in 
three  of the four  cases the hyperbolic  data  yield an imputed  value below 
the true  value.80  Hence hyperbolic  discounting  explains-at  least qual- 
itatively-Dynan's  results.81  However, our imputed  values for p do not 
line up neatly with hers, since most of her point estimates  fall between 
-1/2  and -1. 
The Economy with a Defined Contribution Plan 
In this section we analyze the properties of our exponential and 
hyperbolic  economies with a second asset: a DC pension plan. We first 
consider a perfect commitment  technology in the one asset economy. 
Perfect  Commitment 
Hyperbolic  households  would like to save more  than  they do. If they 
could  costlessly and  perfectly  commit  later  selves, they would  lock in the 
contingent  policy rules of an exponential  household  with a discount  rate 
taken from the appropriate  cell in table 4.  For example, a hyperbolic 
household  in the high school graduate  group  with coefficient  of relative 
risk aversion  equal to 1, would choose to implement  policies associated 
with an exponential  household  with a discount  rate  of 0.0275. 
The contrasts  between the perfect  commitment  case and the no com- 
mitment case are striking.  Average wealth accumulated peaks at 
$298,000  with commitment,  62 percent higher than the peak of 
$184,000  with no commitment. Perfect commitment also generates 
large welfare gains. From  the perspective  of the nineteen-year-old  self, 
the ability to perfectly  commit all future  selves is as valuable  as receiv- 
80.  See Carroll (1997b) for more evidence on the inadequacies  of the linearized 
Euler  equation;  our results support  his. Carroll  also finds that  estimating  the linearized 
Euler equation  on simulated  exponential  data yields regression  coefficients that imply 
too high a value for p. 
81.  Carroll  (1992, 1997a) proposes an alternative  explanation,  based on heteroge- 
neous discount rates. Consumers with high discount rates will have high levels of 
consumption  variability (and those with low discount rates will have low levels of 
variability).  Omitting  the heterogeneous  discount  rates from the regression  will bias x1 
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ing a one-time tax-free windfall equal to 36 percent  of consumption  at 
age twenty.82 The welfare gains evaluated  from the perspective  of later 
selves are substantially  larger, since later selves benefit the most from 
the higher rates of accumulation  early in life. 
For households with coefficient of relative risk aversion  equal to 3, 
the impact of perfect commitment  is smaller:  peak accumulation  rises 
by only 15 percent  and  the welfare  effect is equivalent  to only 2 percent 
of consumption  at age twenty. This contrast  between the different  val- 
ues of the coefficient of relative risk aversion is reflected in all the 
results  presented  below. Commitment-even if perfect-is  not  valuable 
to households  with a relatively  high coefficient  of relative  risk aversion, 
implying  that  they also will not value the cruder  commitment  properties 
in DC plans. 
Institutional  Features  of 401(k)  Plans 
While perfect commitment devices are not available in practice, 
partial  commitment  devices are common. Consumers  can use illiquid 
assets, particularly  DC pension plans, to constrain  future  choice sets. 
401  (k) plans provide  an interesting  case in point. However, they do not 
provide a clean case study of commitment, because their appeal is 
enhanced  by the tax break  on capital income that  they offer. In the rest 
of this section, we evaluate  the efficacy of 401(k) plans for exponential 
and hyperbolic  consumers. 
A wide range of  mechanisms induce employees to contribute to 
401(k) plans and to resist withdrawing  their accumulating  balances. 
First, tax deferral  and  employer  matching  give employees strong  incen- 
tives to contribute.  In a 1997 survey conducted  by Hewitt Associates, 
81 percent  of plans reported  that  the employer  contribution  was contin- 
gent on the employee contribution,  and 21 percent  of all plans reported 
matching contributions  from employers of 50 percent up to 6 percent 
of income.83  This was by far the most common employer arrangement 
among the plans surveyed. 
Second, the standard  plan  compels participants  to set up an automatic 
82.  We assume  that  the windfall  is received in the consumer's  twentieth  year and is 
expressed  as a percentage  of consumption  at age twenty. Note that  this is the first  year 
in which consumption  choices are made;  that is, the first  year of economic life. 
83.  Hewitt Associates (1997). David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  145 
deposit system. In many cases, it is difficult or impossible to change 
the preset  deposit levels on short  notice. Even if a participant  can make 
a change quickly, the results are unlikely to show up in cash holdings 
until the next pay cycle,  which may be a month or two away. Since 
most of the steep drop in hyperbolic  discount functions comes at hori- 
zons of approximately  one week, a one month  delay in implementation 
is more than enough to convince a hyperbolic consumer not to break 
into a nest egg.84 
Third, 401(k) assets are partially  protected  from splurges, because 
withdrawals  from the accounts can be freely made only if the account 
holder is over fifty-nine and a half years old. For younger  consumers, 
withdrawals  are only allowed in cases of financial  hardship  or when a 
worker separates from a firm, and even then generate a  10 percent 
penalty. In most other cases, the withdrawal  penalty is  100 percent. 
Fourth, for consumers who will be limit contributors  in the future, 
withdrawals  cannot be paid back into the account, implying that such 
consumers  are penalized by the loss of future  tax deferrals, as well as 
the original 10 percent  withdrawal  penalty. 
However, the recent trend toward  the establishment  of 401(k) loan 
provisions has undermined  the effectiveness of these plans as a com- 
mitment  device. Almost all (90 percent)  of the plans  surveyed  by Hewitt 
Associates have begun to allow participants  to use their  401(k) balance 
as collateral for a loan.85  Such loan provisions are generally highly 
restrictive  and costly. For example, loans must be less than 50 percent 
of the vested account balance (employer contributions  are often not 
counted  as collateral)  and less than $50,000 in value, and they must be 
paid  back  in five years (ten years  for home loans). Ninety-seven  percent 
of plans restrict  the number  and type of loans, and 46 percent  of plans 
only allow one outstanding  loan.86  And the typical plan charges an 
interest  rate 1  percentage  point  over the prime  rate.87  According  to EBRI 
data, 33 percent  of participants  have loans against their plan, with an 
average balance of $2,500.88 
We do not model all of the institutional  features of 401(k) plans. 
84.  See Laibson  (1997a). 
85.  Hewitt Associates (1997). In 1991, the corresponding  number  was 67 percent. 
86.  Hewitt Associates (1997). 
87.  Hewitt Associates (1995). 
88.  This fact was brought  to our attention  by Eric Engen and William  Gale. 146  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Computational  limitations on the feasible number of state variables 
dictated some simplification. Most important,  our model neglects the 
automatic  deposit  feature  of 401  (k)s and  also the loan provisions. These 
choices mimic those of Engen, Gale, and Scholz. 
Conceptual  Framework for  the 401(k)  Simulations 
Our analysis is an exercise in comparative  statics. We compare an 
economy that has never had and will never have DC plans with one in 
which DC plans have always been and will always be available. Be- 
cause we do not evaluate  the transition  path  between steady states, our 
analysis does not have direct implications for the short-run  impact of 
saving policies.89 Rather, the analysis is useful for highlighting the 
long-run  differences between exponential  and hyperbolic  models. 
Because it is not entirely clear what the institutional  properties  of a 
DC plan system would actually be, we consider a range of arrange- 
ments. First, we vary the early withdrawal  penalty rate between 0.10 
and 0.50; and we consider even more values in the robustness  checks 
described below. If plan sponsors enforce the financial distress rules 
strictly, denying almost all applications,  a penalty  rate of 1.00 may be 
the correct  modeling  assumption.  If their  enforcement  is weak and  they 
sign off on almost all applications,  no matter  what their  intrinsic  merit, 
a penalty rate of  0.10  would be appropriate.  Second, we vary the 
employer matching  rate between 0 and 0.50,  assuming  that employers 
match up to 6 percent of income. We explore these variations  both to 
gain insight into existing heterogeneity  among  DC plans and  to evaluate 
the long-run  effects of potential  changes to existing rules and practice. 
We begin our analysis with representative  examples of our simula- 
tions, postponing  a summary  of our various cases until after we intro- 
duce an aggregation framework. Figure 13 represents the life-cycle 
choices of exponential households in the high school graduate  group 
with coefficient of relative risk aversion  equal to 1, who have access to 
a DC plan with a 0 percent match and a 10 percent penalty for early 
withdrawal. The figure plots average liquid wealth (X), average DC 
plan wealth (Z), average labor income (Y), and average consumption 
89.  Many authors  have shown that the short-run  effects of changes in tax policy 
often go in the opposite direction to the long-run  impacts;  see, for example, Engen, 
Gale, and Scholz (1994). David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  147 
Figure 13. Simulated  Asset, Income, and Consumption  Paths of Exponential 
Households,  Defined  Contribution  Plan Availablea 
Thousands  of 1990  dollars 
350  - 
300  - 
DC plan wealth 
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200- 
150- 
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Age 
Source:  Authors'  simulations. 
a. Figure  plots life-cycle average  consuimption,  pretax  labor  income, liquid  wealth,  and wealth in the DC plan  for households  with 
high school graduate  heads.  The DC plan has a 10 percent  early withdrawal  penalty  and no employer match.  The coefficient of rel- 
ative risk aversion  is equal to 1. 
(C) over the life cycle. Figure 14 represents  these life-cycle choices for 
the corresponding  hyperbolic  households. 
Four properties  stand out in figures 13 and 14. First, most accumu- 
lation occurs in DC plan wealth. Second, total accumulation  is dramat- 
ically larger than in the economy without DC plans (compare with 
figures 5 and 7); we quantify  this difference below. Third, hyperbolic 
consumers  hold lower levels of liquid  assets and  higher  levels of illiquid 
assets than  exponential  consumers.  Fourth,  growth  in DC plan  holdings 
slows after  age sixty (when the early withdrawal  penalty  drops  to zero), 
and DC plan holdings start to fall at retirement. Similar patterns  are 
apparent  in the other cases that we consider. 148  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1998 
Figure 14. Simulated  Asset, Income, and Consumption  Paths of Hyperbolic 
Households,  Defined  Contribution  Plan Availablea 
Thousands  of 1990  dollars 
350  - 
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Source:  Authors'  simlllations. 
a1.  Figure  plots life-cycle average  conisumption,  pretax  labor  income, liquid  wealth,  and  wealth in the DC plan  for households  with 
high school graduate  heads.  The DC plan has a 10 percent  early withdiawal  penalty  and no employer miatch.  The coefficient of rel- 
ative risk aversion  is equal to 1. 
All of the magnitudes  plotted in figures 13 and 14 are based on per 
capita definitions. Linking these per capita magnitudes  to national  ag- 
gregates requires  weighting with survival rates and cohort sizes. Ag- 
gregation  is achieved through  a simple overlapping  generations  model. 
Aggregation 
We rule out general equilibrium  effects by assuming  an open econ- 
omy with a fixed world interest rate. We assume that the economy is 
composed of overlapping  generations.  Intercohort  population  grows at 
1 percent  per year; that is, the cohort born in year t is 1 percent  larger 
than the cohort born in year t -  1. Intercohort  per capita magnitudes David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  149 
grow at 2 percent  per year;  that  is, the outcome  variables,  such as pretax 
income at age thirty-five  and taxes paid at age thirty-five,  of the cohort 
born in year t are 2 percent  larger  than the same outcome variables  of 
the cohort born in year t -  1. The latter  assumption  is slightly distor- 
tionary, because it implies that tax brackets  are cohort specific. 
We also assume  that  the government  adjusts  expenditures  to maintain 
a balanced  budget and carries  no debt in steady state. This assumption 
engenders a bias against finding that DC plans increase net national 
saving when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 1, and 
for finding  that  they do so when the coefficient of relative  risk aversion 
is equal to 3. This bias arises because when the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion is equal to 1, all of the economies with DC plans have 
higher  aggregate  government  tax receipts  than  the corresponding  econ- 
omies without  DC plans, and when the coefficient of relative  risk aver- 
sion is equal to 3, they have lower receipts  (see tables 11 and 14 below). 
To compensate  for this revenue  effect, we simply assume that  the gov- 
ernment  runs  a balanced  budget.  Note, however, that  we only undertake 
steady-state  analysis. Any negative effects on government  saving that 
occur during  the transition  are not captured  in our steady state simula- 
tions. These transition  effects will reduce  government  saving, offsetting 
or adding to, respectively, the biases described  above. 
Our  balanced  budget assumption  also engenders  a bias against find- 
ing that DC plans are particularly  effective in hyperbolic  economies. 
This is because introducing  the DC plan causes revenue to rise by a 
greater  amount, or fall by a smaller amount, in the hyperbolic econ- 
omies than in the exponential  economies (see tables 11 and 14 below). 
This bias occurs with both values of the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion. 
We summarize our steady-state analysis with three statistics: the 
aggregate saving rate, the ratio of government tax revenue to labor 
income, and the percentage  of DC plan wealth accumulation  that rep- 
resents additional saving relative to the economy without a DC plan. 
Formally, we define aggregate  income as 
r 
(GNP),  =  Y, +  Mt +  -  (X, +  Zt),  R 
where  Y,  represents  aggregate  labor  income  receipts  excluding  matching 
payments, Mt represents aggregate employer matching payments, Xt 150  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
represents the aggregate stock of  the liquid asset, Z, represents the 
aggregate  stock of the DC plan, r represents  the interest  rate, and  R is 
equal to 1 +  r. Note that Y, includes defined benefit pension plans, 
private and public, since we assume these are funded out of wages on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. 
Saving is the residual  between  income and  consumption,  both  private 
and public: 
S,=  (GNP),  -  C,-G,, 
where C, represents  aggregate private consumption  and G, represents 
aggregate  government  consumption.  The balanced  budget assumption 
implies that 
G,  =  Tt +  E,  -  Bt+  1, 
where  T,  represents  taxes paid at time t, E, represents  the value of estates 
left at time t,  and Bt+1 represents the value of bequests received at 
the start of period t  +  1. The difference, E,  -  B+1,  represents  be- 
quest taxes (not included in Tt), which turn out to be positive in our 
simulations  90 
The aggregate  saving rate is given by 
St 
(GNP), 
The ratio of government  receipts to total labor income is given by 
G, 
Y, +  M, 
Note that the denominator  of this ratio is the same in the hyperbolic 
and exponential economies-Y  falls to offset the average match. Fi- 
nally, the percentage  of DC plan wealth accumulation  that represents 
new national  saving relative to the no DC plan economy is given by 
xt + zt -  X, 
zt 
90.  The estate tax rate implied by our analysis varies between 50 percent and 75 
percent. This is high, but not as high as it looks, because it includes income taxes on 
401(k) assets, which are payable  on the death  of the consumer. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  151 
where  X, represents  the amount  of aggregate  liquid assets accumulated 
in the economy without a DC plan. 
Results for  Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion Equal to 1 
Table 10 reports  saving rates in the no DC plan and DC plan over- 
lapping  generations  economies with coefficient  of relative  risk aversion 
equal to 1. Saving rates are  reported  for each educational  group  and  for 
the whole economy. We first consider the results for the exponential 
households. 
The exponential economy without a DC plan has a steady-state  ag- 
gregate  saving rate  of 4.14 percent.  The corresponding  rates  for the DC 
plan exponential  economies are very different. Consider  the case of 50 
percent  employer  matching.  With a 10 percent  withdrawal  penalty, the 
saving rate rises to 7.63 percent;  with a 50 percent  penalty, it rises to 
8.35 percent. These represent  increases  of 84.3 percent  and 101.7 per- 
cent, respectively. With no matching, the percentage increases are 
smaller, although still quite large. With a 10 percent  penalty, the ag- 
gregate  saving  rate  increases  by 60.6 percent;  with a 50 percent  penalty, 
it increases by 64.3 percent. 
One would intuitively expect DC plans to have a bigger impact on 
hyperbolic  economies, since hyperbolic  households  value commitment. 
Table 10 confirms  this conjecture.  With 50 percent  employer  matching 
and  a 10 percent  withdrawal  penalty, the aggregate  saving  rate  increases 
by 99.2 percent;  and with a 50 percent penalty, it increases by 134.0 
percent. With no matching and a 10 percent penalty, the aggregate 
saving rate increases  by 81.  1 percent;  and with a 50 percent  penalty, it 
increases  by 102.8 percent.  These results  are  even larger  than  the saving 
increases  recorded  by the exponential  households.  Defined  contribution 
plans generally double the net saving rates in hyperbolic economies 
relative to exponential  economies. 
Three additional  features stand out in the simulation  results. First, 
the college  graduate group generally realizes the smallest DC plan 
effects in percentage  terms. Because these households  have the highest 
income levels and are the most patient, they are most likely to hit the 
contribution  caps, thereby  mitigating  the substitution  effect. However, 
the DC plan effects do not fall monotonically  with education. In many 
cases, they are stronger  for the high school graduate  group  than  for the cn  C"l cn  cn  cl-I  (O"  "C cq  cq  O  00 
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households whose head did not graduate  from high school, probably 
reflecting the fact that the DC plan generates more tax relief for the 
high school graduate  group. 
Second, hyperbolic  consumers  respond  relatively  well to higher  pen- 
alties for early withdrawal.  In the case of 50 percent  employer match- 
ing, when  the penalty  rises from 10 percent  to 50 percent,  the hyperbolic 
saving rate rises from 7.79  percent to 9.15  percent (a 17.5 percent 
increase), while the exponential  saving rate  only rises from  7.63 percent 
to 8.35 percent (a 9.4 percent  increase). Likewise, in the no matching 
case, when the penalty rises from 10 percent  to 50 percent, the hyper- 
bolic saving rate  rises from  7.08 percent  to 7.93 percent  (a 12.0 percent 
increase), while the exponential  saving rate rises from 6.65 percent  to 
6.80 percent (a 2.3 percent  increase). 
Third, hyperbolic  consumers  are  relatively  less sensitive to the elim- 
ination of employer matching. In the case of a 10 percent withdrawal 
penalty, removing the match reduces the hyperbolic saving rate from 
7.79 percent  to 7.08 percent (a 9.1 percent  decrease), while the expo- 
nential saving rate falls from 7.63  percent to 6.65  percent (a  12.8 
percent decrease). Likewise, in the case of a 50 percent penalty, re- 
moving the match  reduces  the hyperbolic  saving rate  from  9.15 percent 
to 7.93 percent  (a 13.3 percent  decrease), while the exponential  saving 
rate  falls from 8.35 percent  to 6.80 percent  (an 18.6 percent  decrease). 
In the no match  condition, exponential  consumers  have relatively weak 
incentives to invest. They gain only the tax deferral  and pay the price 
of lost liquidity. By contrast, hyperbolic  consumers  both gain the tax 
deferral  and partially  benefit from the lost liquidity. 
Turning  to the government  sector, table 11 reports  government  rev- 
enue as a percentage  of labor  income. Our  balanced  budget  assumption 
implies that  government  revenue  equals  government  consumption,  gen- 
erating a cost or benefit of the DC plan regime that is not captured  in 
the higher saving rate. In all of our simulations with coefficient of 
relative risk aversion equal to 1, the DC plan economy is associated 
with higher government  revenues, and these effects are strongest for 
the hyperbolic  consumers.  If some of this increased  revenue  were chan- 
neled into saving instead of government  consumption,  national  saving 
would rise even higher in the DC plan regime. These increases in 
revenue are substantial,  representing  approximately  1 percent  of labor 
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In table 12 we report  the percentage  of DC plan accumulation  that 
represents  new savings: 
x,  +  z,  -  it 
tz 
Note that total new savings is equal to the stock of DC plan wealth 
multiplied  by the ratio reported  in table 12: 
z (X+  z,-  t 
t 
zt 
This table demonstrates  that, in general, values of (Xt +  Zt -X,)/Z 
are higher for hyperbolic than for exponential consumers. Hence hy- 
perbolic  consumers  save more  than  exponential  consumers  both  because 
hyperbolic  consumers  invest relatively  heavily in DC plan accounts  and 
because their DC plan investments  exhibit a uniformly  higher percent- 
age of new savings. 
Finally, our welfare measure  is constructed  in three steps. We first 
calculate the average welfare of households of age t for the economies 
with and without DC plans. Note that average welfare is calculated 
from the perspective  of self t. Next, we record  the consumption  (Cj) of 
each household at age t. We then find A,, such that giving each t-year- 
old household  in the no DC plan economy a one-time unexpected  after- 
tax wealth windfall of XACi,  raises average welfare in that economy to 
the same level as average welfare in the DC plan economy. Thus our 
welfare measure  is 1OOXA.  It is defined for each self {20, 21, 22,  . 
T  +  N}, but in the interest of brevity we only report  it for selves 20, 
40, 60, 80. 
We report the welfare results in table 13. These effects are quite 
large. For example, twenty-year-old  hyperbolic high school graduate 
households  in the no DC plan  economy need to receive a wealth  transfer 
equal to 70 percent  of consumption  at age twenty to make them as well 
off as the average corresponding  household in the DC plan economy 
with 50 percent  employer matching  and a 10 percent withdrawal  pen- 
alty. This effect compares favorably with that for similarly situated 
exponential  households, who experience a welfare effect of 22 percent 
of consumption.  Note that  the welfare gains for exponential  households 
arise from the reduction  in the taxation of capital income. The hyper- '0  I  -o 
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bolic consumers  benefit  both from this tax reduction  and  from the com- 
mitment  properties  of the DC plan. 
Three patterns  stand out in table 13. First, welfare effects are uni- 
formly higher for the hyperbolic households, reflecting the value of 
commitment. Second, the absolute magnitudes  of the welfare effects 
grow until retirement,  since early accumulation  disproportionately  ben- 
efits the later  selves who spend  those accumulated  assets. Third,  welfare 
effects  increase monotonically with  education, reflecting the  fact 
that more patient consumers can better exploit tax policies that favor 
accumulation. 
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion Equal to 3 
We have shown that perfect commitment  is much more valuable to 
hyperbolic  consumers  with coefficient of relative  risk aversion  equal to 
1 than  to those with coefficient of relative risk aversion  equal to 3. The 
results  reported  below confirm  that  the gap between DC plan effects for 
exponential  and hyperbolic  consumers  shrinks  as the coefficient of rel- 
ative  risk  aversion  increases. 
Tables 14 to 17 are analogous  to tables 10 to 13 for a coefficient of 
relative  risk aversion  equal  to 3. Most of the qualitative  results  in tables 
14 to  17 mirror  those in the earlier tables. In particular,  hyperbolic 
households uniformly respond more favorably to DC plans than do 
exponential  households. This is true  by almost all measures, including 
the national saving rate, government  revenue, and consumer  welfare. 
However, the gaps between the exponential and the hyperbolic  ef- 
fects are much smaller in tables 14 to 17 than in tables 10 to 13. For 
example, when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is equal to 3, 
DC plans cause the aggregate saving rate in the exponential  economy 
to rise by between 23.2 percent and 35.5 percent, depending on the 
institutional assumptions. Likewise, they cause the aggregate saving 
rate in the hyperbolic economy to rise by between 26.2 percent and 
38.2 percent. By contrast,  when the coefficient of relative  risk aversion 
is equal to 1, DC plans cause the aggregate  saving rate in the exponen- 
tial economy to rise by between 60.6  percent and 101.7  percent, 
whereas  they cause the aggregate  saving  rate  in the hyperbolic  economy 
to rise by between 81.1 percent  and 134.0 percent. 
The choice of the coefficient of relative risk aversion suggests a ~4) 
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framework  for comparing  our results with those of Engen, Gale, and 
Scholz. These authors assume a coefficient of relative risk aversion 
equal to 3 and report  that DC plans generate increases in the steady- 
state saving rate  of between 9. 1 percent  and 17.2 percent, not far from 
the range we report above for exponential discounters.9' Our work 
complements theirs, confirming their results and showing how they 
depend  on the coefficient of relative risk aversion.92 
In summary,  when the coefficient of relative risk aversion is close 
to 3, DC plans are predicted to have limited impact, whether or not 
preferences  are  hyperbolic.  By contrast,  when  the coefficient  of relative 
risk aversion  is close to unity, such plans will have substantial  impact, 
and their impact will be even greater  if discount functions are hyper- 
bolic. Unfortunately,  we do not have much insight into the value of the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion. Our  preferred  model, with coeffi- 
cient of  relative risk aversion equal to  1 and an implied measured 
elasticity of  intertemporal  substitution of 0.22,  is  supported  by the 
available empirical evidence. However, it is also possible to make a 
case for a coefficient of relative  risk aversion  equal  to 3 with an implied 
elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  of 0. 15. We hope that future 
research  will be able to pin down these parameters. 
Robustness and Extensions 
In this section we consider several extensions to our benckmark 
model. 
Varying the Value of J3 
We have discussed above our reasons for setting ,3 equal to 0.85. 
While the available experimental  evidence supports  a much lower cal- 
91.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz's (1994) analysis is steady state, in the sense that is 
performed  at a seventy-year  horizon from the inception of the policy. All consumers 
alive at this date have had access to 401(k)s throughout  their  lives. 
92.  There are other differences between our model and that of Engen, Gale, and 
Scholz, but we believe that  the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion  assumption  is by far 
the most important.  In their  model, earnings  shocks are  more  persistent,  the contribution 
cap is lower, the bequest process is perfectly predictable,  and the median calibrated 
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Table 18. Aggregate  Saving Rate, Government  Revenue,  and New Savings  for 
Selected Values  of  Oa 
Percent 
Value  of /8 
Item  1  0.85  0.8 
Aggregrate  saving  rateb 
No DC plan  4.1  3.9  3.9 
With  DC planc  6.7  7.1  7.3 
Percent  differenced  60.6  81.1  86.2 
Government  revenuee 
No DC plan  13.3  13.1  13.1 
With  DC planc  13.5  13.6  13.7 
Percent  differenced  0.8  3.7  4.6 
New savings  in DC plan'  45.5  51.0  52.0 
Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. All  simulations assume a population comprising the three educational groups in proportions specified in table  10, 
note b. 
b. Saving as a percentage of income; see table 10, note a. 
c.  Assumes a 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal and no employer matching contribution. 
d. Percent increase in moving from an economy without a DC plan to an economy with a DC plan. 
e.  Percent of labor income; see table  11, note a. 
f.  Percent of DC plan savings that represents new savings; see table 12, note a. 
ibration,  such low values generate  pathologies  in discrete  time models. 
We now demonstrate  how our results would likely change if we were 
to choose lower values of P3. 
We report  simulation  results  for the exponential  case, P3  equal  to 1, our 
benchmark  hyperbolic  case, ,B  equal  to 0.85, and  a new case for compar- 
ison, P3  equal to 0.80. We choose to explore  this last case because  it is 
close to our hyperbolic  benchmark  and does not exhibit  the pathologies 
discussed  above. For  P equal  to 0. 80, we follow the steps  described  above 
for calibrating  the preference  parameters.  Specifically,  we solve for long- 
run discount  factors-6NHS  0,  HS  080 
L  -o  that  these simulations 
replicate  the actual  level of preretirement  wealth  holdings. 
In tables 18 and 19 we report  analysis  for a DC plan with a 10 percent 
withdrawal  penalty and no employer matching. To a first approxima- 
tion, the DC plan effects are approximately  linear in the magnitude  of 
(1 -,B).  More precisely, the saving rate  effects are slightly concave in 
(1  -  ,B), while the welfare effects are generally strongly convex in 
(1  -  ,B).  For example, introducing  the DC plan raises the aggregate 
saving rate  by 60.6 percent  in the exponential  case, 81.  1 percent  in our 
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Table 19. Welfare  Impact of Defined Contribution  Plans for Selected Values  of Oa 
Percent  of current  consumption 
Value  of ,B 
Education  Age  1  0.85  0.8 
High school dropouts  20  9  27  41 
40  34  81  95 
60  154  215  220 
80  92  99  118 
High school graduates  20  28  71  99 
40  104  180  202 
60  250  327  334 
80  153  192  240 
College graduates  20  70  142  183 
40  187  242  264 
60  300  328  349 
80  224  254  277 
Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. Welfare impact gives cash equivalent value to each consumer of moving from an economy without a DC plan to one 
with a DC plan, with the cash value expressed as a percentage of the current annual consumption of the consumer in the 
economy without a DC plan. For details of calculation,  see table 13, note a. Table assumes a DC plan with a 10 percent 
penalty for early withdrawal and no employer matching contribution. 
case. It generates  a welfare gain for twenty-year-old  high school grad- 
uate households equivalent  to 28 percent  of consumption  in the expo- 
nential case, 71 percent of consumption  in our benchmark  hyperbolic 
case, and 99 percent  of consumption  in the new comparison  case. 
If these results apply globally, the hyperbolic  effects-the  gap be- 
tween the hyperbolic and the exponential DC plan simulations-will 
rise significantly  as ,B  falls. The available experimental  evidence sug- 
gests that 0.60 is an appropriate  calibration  value for P3.  If the hyper- 
bolic effects rise linearly with (1  -  ,3), the true hyperbolic effect is 
two to three times as large as the effects reported  above, where our 
maintained  hypothesis was ,B  equal to 0.85. 
Varying the Early Withdrawal Penalty 
In the simulations  reported  above, we consider  withdrawal  penalties  of 
10 percent  and  50 percent.  In table  20, we also evaluate  a wider  range  of 
penalty  values-1O,  30, 50, and 70 percent-for  a representative  case, 
with  no employer  matching  for high school  graduate  households  and  coef- 
ficient  of relative  risk aversion  equal  to 1. These simulations  indicate  that *m  "C  N  C  "C  ?t- N  00  .. 
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penalties  in the neighborhood  of 50 percent  are optimal  if the goal is to 
raise  steady-state  national  saving.  Such  a penalty  creates  a strong  incentive 
to avoid early withdrawals  from the DC plan, but it is not so high as to 
discourage  contributions  in the first  place. 
Modeling  a World with both Exponential 
and Hyperbolic  Consumers 
All of our simulations  are based on the premise that an economy is 
either  completely exponential  or completely hyperbolic.  However, it is 
also reasonable  to assume that the economy comprises a mixed popu- 
lation of exponential and hyperbolic consumers, where the latter are 
relatively more impatient  than the former. 
To simulate this case,  we assume that each educational group is 
evenly divided between exponential  and hyperbolic  consumers.93  Fur- 
thermore  we assume that within each educational group, exponential 
and hyperbolic households have the same long-term  discount factors: 
6NHS,  8HS,  6COLL.  For all consumers, we set the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion  equal to 1. For the exponential  consumers,  we set ,3  equal 
to 1, and for the hyperbolic  consumers  we set ,3  equal to 0.85. We then 
follow the steps described  above for calibrating  the preference  param- 
eters. We solve for the long-run discount factors, so that the mixed 
population  replicates the actual median level of preretirement  wealth 
holdings. In this way, we obtain long-run  discount rates for the three 
educational groups of 0.0427,  0.0335,  and 0.0257,  respectively. As 
expected, these discount  rates lie close to the midpoints  of the discount 
rates  for exponential  and  hyperbolic  consumers  reported  in our original 
calibration  exercise (see table 4). Figure 15 plots the resulting  simula- 
tions for exponential  and  hyperbolic  consumers  in the high school grad- 
uate group in the economy without a DC plan. The exponential con- 
sumers save far more than the corresponding  hyperbolic  consumers. 
Figure 16 plots the percentage  of liquidity-constrained  high school 
graduates  in our hybrid simulation for an economy with no defined 
contribution  plan. This graph  is comparable  to the upper  panel of fig- 
ure 11, which plots the percentage  of liquidity-constrained  consumers 
93.  If education is an endogenous outcome, it might make sense to assume that 
households  in the college graduate  group are disproportionately  exponential:  it may be 
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Figure  15.  Simulated  Liquid Asset,  Income,  and Consumption  Paths in a 
Hybrid World without  a Defined Contribution  Plana 
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SoLirce: Authors'  simulations. 
a. Figui-e plots  average  consum-ption,  pretax  labor  income,  and liquid  wealth  for households  with  high  school  graduate  heads.  The 
populatioti  comprises  50  percent  exponetitial  and 50  percent  hypet-bolic  households,  and the  iiiodel  is calibrated  under the assump- 
tion  that both  types  of  household  have  the  same  long-term  discount  factor  (b). 
in  the  nonhybrid  simulations.  Note  that the  percentage  of  liquidity- 
constrained hyperbolic  consumers in figure 16 is greater than in figure 
I11, since  the hyperbolic  consumers  in the hybrid simulation  are more 
impatient than those  in the nonhybrid simulation.  Similarly,  the per- 
centage  of liquidity-constrained  exponential  consumers in figure 16 is 
less than in figure I11,  because the exponential  consumers in the hybrid 
simulation  are less  impatient than those in the nonhybrid simulation. 
Using our calibrated hybrid populations,  we then evaluate the impact 
of  DC  plans.  Table  21  reports the results  of  this  simulation.  In our 
hybrid economy,  exponential consumers experience an increase of 58.0 
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Figure 16. Share of High School Graduates  Who Are Liquidity  Constrained, 
Hybrid Economya 
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Source:  AuIthors'  simiiulations. 
at.  Figure  plots simulated  percent  of households in the high school groLIp  who are liquidity  constrained  (less than  $400 in liquid 
assets) in the economy in which half of consumers are exponential and half are hyperbolic. The coefficient of  relative risk 
aversion  is equal to 1, and  exponential  and hyperbolic  consumers  have the saine long-terin  discount  factor (s). 
experience an increase  of 86.3 percent, yielding an aggregate  increase 
of 68.0 percent. The corresponding  increases in the nonhybrid  simula- 
tions are 60.6 percent  for exponential  consumers  and 81.1 percent  for 
hyperbolic  consumers. As expected, the percentage  change in the hy- 
brid simulations  is lower for the exponential  consumers  and higher for 
the hyperbolic  consumers  than  in the nonhybrid  simulations.  The reason 
for this is that in the hybrid  simulation  the exponential  consumers  are 
more patient and the hyperbolic  consumers  are more impatient  than in 
the nonhybrid  simulation, leading to more asset shifting by the former 
and less by the latter. 
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Table  21. Aggregate  Impact of Defined Contribution  Plans for a Population 
Comprising  Exponential  and Hyperbolic  Consumersa 
Percent 
Exponential  Hyperbolic  Aggregate 
Item  consumers  consumers  population 
Aggregrate  saving  rateb 
No DC plan  5.4  2.9  4.2 
With  DC planc  8.5  5.5  7.0 
Percent  differenced  58.0  86.3  68.0 
Government  revenuee 
No DC plan  14.3  12.4  13.4 
With  DC planc  15.5  12.7  13.6 
Percent  differenced  8.4  2.6  1.9 
New savings  in DC plan'  44.3  51.9  47.2 
Source: Authors' simulations. 
a. Table shows the aggregate impact of DC plans under the assumption that the population comprises 50 percent expo- 
nential households and 50 percent hyperbolic households. Long-term discount rates are calibrated such that the preretirement 
median ratio of wealth to income in the simulated no DC plan economy matches the ratio in the data. The underlying long- 
term discount rates are the same for all consumers within an educational category. For the share of each educational group 
in the population, see table 10, note a. 
b. Saving as a percentage of income; see table 10, note a. 
c.  Assumes a 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal and no employer matching contribution. 
d. Percent increase in moving from an economy without a DC plan to an economy with a DC plan. 
e.  Percent of labor income; see table 11, note a. 
f.  Percent of DC plan savings that represents new savings; see table 12, note a. 
counting.  If  hyperbolic  discounters  are relatively  more  impatient  than 
exponential  discounters  (which  is  true  in the  hybrid  simulation  but  not 
in  the  nonhybrid  simulations),  DC  plans  will  have  a larger  percentage 
impact  on  hyperbolic  households  than  on  exponential  households,  for 
two  distinct  reasons.94  First,  hyperbolic  households  value  commitment. 
And  second,  hyperbolic  households  are  relatively  impatient  and  are 
therefore  less  likely  to have  accumulated  assets  which  they  can  simply 
shift  into  the  DC  plan. 
Conclusions  and  Directions  for  Future  Research 
In  this  paper  we  start  by  showing  that  life-cycle  consumption  and 
asset  accumulation  patterns  are consistent  with  a hyperbolic  model.  At 
94.  In the nonhybrid  simulations,  the calibration  guarantees  that  the exponential  and 
hyperbolic  consumers  accumulate  the same amount  of preretirement  savings if they do 
not have access to the DC plan. In the nonhybrid  simulations,  the effects of hyperbolic  < 
P.rponentiaj  are offset by setting  lhvprbolic  >  8exponetitial David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  171 
a first  glance, the life-cycle choices of hyperbolic  and  exponential  con- 
sumers are indistinguishable.  However, hyperbolic  consumers  exhibit 
some special regularities  that enable researchers  to distinguish them 
from their exponential  counterparts:  they are much more likely to en- 
counter liquidity constraints, and they exhibit the anomalous  precau- 
tionary saving effects documented  by Dynan.95  These hyperbolic  phe- 
nomena are implied by the generalized  Euler equation. 
We then consider another  distinction  between hyperbolic  and expo- 
nential behavior. We show that hyperbolic  consumers  will react much 
more favorably to defined contribution  pension plans than equivalent 
exponential  consumers. Our  benchmark  simulations  for an exponential 
economy-with  coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 1 and a 
measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  of 0.27-show  that 
DC plans with early withdrawal  penalties  of between 10 percent  and  50 
percent  raise the steady-state  net national  saving rate by 61 percent  to 
102 percent. By contrast, in a hyperbolic  economy (with coefficient of 
relative risk aversion equal to  1 and a measured elasticity of inter- 
temporal substitution of 0.22)  such plans raise the steady state net 
national saving rate by 81 percent to 134 percent. These results are 
sensitive to the calibration  of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. 
Higher values of the coefficient of relative risk aversion significantly 
reduce the effects of  DC plans in both exponential and hyperbolic 
economies. 
This work should be extended in several directions. First, the mag- 
nitudes of the effects that we find need to be examined for hyperbolic 
discounters  with values of ,3 below those that we consider. We choose 
relatively  high values  for this parameter  to avoid  pathologies.  The hyper- 
bolic effects would be much stronger  for lower values of ,3, and most 
experimental  evidence suggests that a value of 0.6  would best match 
consumer  preferences.  For  reasons  we have discussed  above, simulations 
with low values for ,3 need to be implemented  in continuous  time.96 
Second, the dynamic process that takes an economy from a steady 
state without a DC plan to a steady state with a DC plan should be 
evaluated. As Engen, Gale, and Scholz, and others have pointed out, 
95.  Dynan (1993). 
96.  This requires  an alternative  approximation  to the hyperbolic  discount  function. 
The quasi-hyperbolic  discount  function  does not have a direct  analog  in continuous  time. 172  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
the short-run  effects of a tax incentive often take the opposite sign to 
the long-run  effects.97 
Third, the set of commitment  devices available to hyperbolic con- 
sumers  in the model should be enriched. We compare  a world with no 
endogenous  commitment  devices to a world with one endogenous  com- 
mitment  device: a DC pension plan. In the real world, there are a wide 
range of commitment  devices and the introduction  of DC plans may 
simply lead hyperbolic consumers  to switch from a preexisting com- 
mitment  device to this new one. 
Fourth, if the economy does not in fact contain good alternative 
commitment devices,  something may be wrong with the hyperbolic 
model. If consumers have hyperbolic discount functions and are so- 
phisticated,  they should  want  banks  or other  financial  institutions  to sell 
commitment devices.  One sees many instruments  with commitment 
properties,  but  very few that  are  sold explicitly for this purpose.  Perhaps 
illiquid assets span the commitment  space. If they do not, why have 
banks not filled the gaps? Are consumers too myopic (or too embar- 
rassed) to seek out explicit commitment  devices? 
Fifth, the other behavioral facets of DC plans should be formally 
analyzed. To the extent that such plans do raise national  saving, they 
may do so for reasons not modeled in this paper. For example, DC 
plans simplify the investment  process, helping  consumers  with bounded 
rationality  make good investments;  and they make interpersonal  com- 
parisons of saving more transparent,  perhaps  shaming  consumers  into 
saving more. Although we do not model automatic  deductions  in this 
paper, we believe that this popular  feature  of DC plans plays a partic- 
ularly important  role in encouraging  accumulation.  As Public Agenda 
reports, "Americans overwhelmingly (77 percent) prefer to save for 
retirement  through  automatic  deductions  from  their  paychecks,  with only 
a fifth (19 percent)  preferring  to make a savings  decision  each time they 
get paid."98  It is not known why automatic  deductions  are attractive. 
Perhaps  they serve as a commitment  device. Perhaps  they simplify  deci- 
sionmaking  for consumers  with  bounded  rationality.  Defined  contribution 
plans use a rich array  of psychologically  appealing  features  to induce 
saving.99  Economists  should  do more  to understand  these effects. 
97.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994). 
98.  Farkas  and Johnson  (1997, p. 28). 
99.  See Laibson  (1998) for a review  of the psychological  effects induced  by DC plans. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: This paper  combines a staggering  amount  of empirical 
and simulation work with a lot of deep thinking about intertemporal 
consumption  choice. Although  the idea of temporally  inconsistent  pref- 
erences is not new, the paper  advances  the empirical  application  of this 
line of thought  tremendously, and I congratulate  the authors  for their 
unusual  combination  of computational  effort guided by intelligence. 
Let me start with a discussion of the three-period  case with log 
utility. Using C, to denote consumption  in period t and ,( to represent 
the one-time discount factor, the preferences  of the three selves are as 
follows: 
As of period  Utility 
1  ln C1 +  ,3(ln  C2 +  ln C3) 
2  ln C2 +  3 ln  C3 
3  ln C3. 
There is only one inconsistency: self 1 weights utility in period 2 and 
in period  3 equally, whereas  self 2 puts greater  weight on period  2 than 
on period 3. 
Assume a zero real interest  rate. Then  the recursive  equilibrium  with 
wealth W is 
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I  (I  +  23) 
2=  [(1  +  0(I  +  213)] 
C3  =  (  +  0)(I  +  20 
Self 3 has a passive role, simply consuming whatever wealth earlier 
selves have left to it. Self 2 takes the wealth that self  1 leaves and 
divides it between consumption  in periods 2 and 3,  according to its 
preferences, which are tilted toward immediate consumption. Self  1 
considers  all available  wealth and thinks  through  the behavior  of self 2 
in the course of deciding how much to consume in period 1 and how 
much to leave to self 2. Notice that consumption  declines over time. 
There is a tendency to spend rather  than save. 
Now suppose that self 1 can commit future levels of consumption. 
This would only take a mechanism where self  1 can set aside some 
wealth that is inaccessible to self 2 but is available to self 3-pretty 
much the effect of a 401(k) plan. The consumption  pattern  with com- 
mitment  is as follows: 
I  (I +  21)  p 
C2  =  (+  )  =  (  ;  C2  <  C2 
C3=  (W  +  )  =  (l  ;)C3  >  C3 
This is the standard  consumer  problem  with log or Cobb-Douglas  pref- 
erences. Initial consumption  is higher, but consumption  levels are the 
same in periods 2 and 3. Notice that period 1 consumption  is the same 
with and  without  commitment.  The differences  occur  in period  2, where 
consumption  is lower with commitment, and in period 3, where con- 
sumption  is higher. 
Commitment  results in more midlife saving. As the paper  stresses, 
self 1 will use a 401(k) or other commitment  mechanism  to enforce its David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  175 
preferences for equal levels of consumption  in all periods other than 
the first, to prevent  the declining profile  of consumption  that  will result 
from the repeated  attempts  of later selves to spend more  on themselves. 
One can consider  the selves different  consumers, and then apply the 
standard  theory of consumption  externalities to think about welfare. 
Each self has externalities  with the consumption  levels chosen  by future 
selves. There  is no single welfare or utility function  that  orders  lifetime 
patterns  of consumption.  Rather, there is only the partial  ordering  as- 
sociated with Pareto  comparisons.  Although  with realistic lifetimes the 
committed  path  Pareto-dominates  the recursive  equilibrium,  that is not 
the case in this example. Self 2 receives higher utility in the recursive 
case. 
As in any situation with externalities, a Pareto improvement  from 
the recursive  equilibrium  is possible. A small shift of consumption  from 
period 1 to period 3 would make all selves better  off. Absent commit- 
ment, self 1 cannot  bring about  that shift. Leaving more wealth to self 
2 will result in an increase in period 2 consumption,  which is already 
excessive by self l's  standards.  The paper  points out that commitment 
can Pareto-dominate  the recursive  equilibrium  if there  are  more  periods. 
The correction  of the downward  bias of consumption  over time is ben- 
eficial to earlier selves, all of whom place equal weight on later con- 
sumption.  The resulting  higher  level of wealth  gives more  consumption 
to later selves, so they benefit as well. But my example shows that  this 
is not always the case. 
As this paper emphasizes-and  the earlier work of  Laibson and 
others on inconsistent preferences demonstrates-panel  data on con- 
sumption  show remarkably  little difference  between the consistent and 
inconsistent cases. Both result in similar Euler equations. The paper 
calls attention  to two differences: liquidity constraints  are binding for 
a higher fraction of the population in the inconsistent case, and the 
Dynan anomaly occurs with inconsistent  but not with consistent pref- 
erences. The high incidence of complete liquidity constraints-shown 
as a matter  of theory  and as a matter  of data  in figures 10 through  12- 
is a persuasive  part  of the case in favor of inconsistency, as I read the 
evidence. 
An important  finding is the huge benefit enjoyed by inconsistent 
consumers if they have a commitment  mechanism structured  roughly 
like a 401  (k). Funds  can be placed  in the account  voluntarily,  but cannot 176  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
be removed by later selves until retirement  age. The 401(k) permits 
earlier selves to flatten the later consumption  profile. The very same 
selves who would withdraw  funds from the account  if allowed to do so 
will put funds into the account precisely because later selves are not 
allowed to withdraw! 
Consumers  with consistent preferences also benefit from 401(k)s. 
Thus the widespread  use of these accounts is not evidence in favor of 
inconsistent  preferences. But given persuasive  other evidence, the so- 
cial value of these accounts  seems to be substantial.  And the social cost 
of provisions that give easier access to them prior  to retirement  is also 
high, as the paper  stresses. The ideal 401(k) is administered  by a wise 
and knowledgeable  outsider who will dispense funds for a true emer- 
gency but will block requests  that would finance  higher consumption. 
In addition  to 401  (k)s, the public  uses many  other  commitment  mech- 
anisms. Social security is surely the largest of these. People buy tax- 
deferred  annuities  and  life insurance  with committed  saving provisions. 
They join Christmas  clubs. They overpay income taxes so as to get 
refunds. The viability of these financial  arrangements  and products  is 
the most persuasive  evidence in favor of inconsistent  preferences.  The 
evidence is all the stronger  because these products  are such bad deals 
in comparison  with the best ways to save. The typical 401(k) offers a 
variety of mutual funds, each with expenses of around  2 percent of 
asset value per year (1.2 percent  as disclosed expenses and 0.8 percent 
as hidden soft dollar trading  costs). Then, the administrator  tacks on 
another  percent or so in fees. These costs take away about half of the 
expected real return  of the saving. And Christmas  clubs, tax-deferred 
annuities, and insurance  policies fare even worse. Social security is 
currently  a very poor deal for higher  wage workers,  even though  it was 
a fantastic  deal for earlier  generations. 
This paper, and all of Laibson's related  work on hyperbolic  prefer- 
ences, deals with people who consume  too much, in the sense that  they 
would consume less  if they had a good commitment mechanism. I 
wonder,  though, if there  are  not other  people with the opposite  problem: 
they are  inconsistent  in weighting  current  consumption  below any future 
consumption.  These people always plan to consume in the future, but 
when the future comes around, it seems better to defer consumption 
even longer. They die with a large fraction of wealth unspent. These 
people would also benefit from a commitment  mechanism, where they David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  177 
can commit in one period to consume in later periods. The authors 
dismiss this possibility at the beginning of  the paper as intuitively 
implausible, but I am not so sure. 
William G. Gale: Among  the many  contributions  that  this paper  makes, 
two stand  out: developing a detailed simulation  model of consumption 
and saving under  hyperbolic  discounting, and analyzing  tax-based  sav- 
ing incentives in that  model. I focus on the role of hyperbolic  discount- 
ing and other assumptions  and on the simulation  results. 
The authors  assume that people (a) have hyperbolic  discount func- 
tions; (b) are "sophisticates," that is, they understand  that their long- 
term discount rates are lower than their short-term  rates; and (c) have 
a constant  coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 1. Under these 
assumptions, people have a hard  time saving, know they have such a 
problem, and find commitment  devices that help them save to be very 
valuable.  For  example, the authors  show that  the availability  of a perfect 
commitment  device would be worth 36 percent  of consumption  at age 
twenty. 
A key implication of  these assumptions is that people would be 
willing to pay for a commitment  mechanism.  However, there  are  almost 
no examples  of popular  commitment  devices that  cost money. The paper 
notes there were 10 million participants  in holiday clubs in 1996. Bal- 
ances, however, appear  to be quite small. Blayne Cutler  reports  that 
one bank with a large number  of such accounts had average accumu- 
lation of $500 before being liquidated.1  This suggests aggregate  accu- 
mulation  of $5 billion before liquidation, which represents  only 2 per- 
cent of annual personal saving, or 0.02  percent of financial assets. 
Excess withholding  of income taxes can be explained  by many factors 
besides its being a method  of forced saving, such as uncertain  income 
or deductions, biased withholding schedules, costs of changing with- 
holding, and costs of audits. 
If there were demand  for commitment  mechanisms, they would be 
extremely  easy to create. Workers  could ask their  employers  for higher 
penalties  or stricter  withdrawal  procedures  on 401(k)s, but typically do 
not. In fact, firms that want to raise workers' participation  rates in 
1. Blayne Cutler, "Buy Today, Pay Yesterday,"  American  Demographics,  Decem- 
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401(k) plans often provide more generous provisions for loans and 
hardship  withdrawals;  that is, they make  401(k)s less of a commitment 
mechanism. Voters could lobby legislators for public policies  that 
raised the penalty  on tax-deferred  saving, but typically do not. Indeed, 
the trend in public policy is just the opposite, allowing for increased 
withdrawals  from tax-deferred  accounts.2 
Why won't households  pay to commit  their  future  selves? One  reason 
may simply be that  the demand  for commitment  is small. Another  may 
be that households can obtain the level of commitment  they desire via 
tax-favored devices. In fact, almost all popular  commitment  devices 
associated  with saving-such  as housing, pensions, 401(k)s, IRAs, and 
tax-deferred  annuities-possess  substantial  tax advantages.  Even in this 
case, however, several factors suggest that demand for commitment 
mechanisms  may be small. 
First, participation  in tax-favored  vehicles appears  to be closely re- 
lated to their tax benefits. For example, pension coverage, 401(k) par- 
ticipation (conditional  on eligibility), and annuity  purchases  rise with 
tax rates.3  IRA contributions  plummeted  after the tax preferences  and 
advertising  for such accounts were reduced in 1986, even though the 
commitment  aspects-namely,  the early withdrawal  penalties-did  not 
change. This suggests that  commitment  was not what motivated  people 
to participate  in the first  place. Second, those who participate  in saving 
incentives tend to have relatively large amounts  of liquid assets,' sug- 
gesting that they do have the self-control to commit to saving without 
an explicit commitment  mechanism. Third, only about 10 percent of 
households currently  contribute  to IRAs, even though such accounts 
provide tax savings for almost all households, and about half of the 
workforce  does not have a 401(k) plan or a pension of any kind. 
Finally, a strong demand  for commitment  creates some interesting 
hypothetical  possibilities for economic behavior  that are worth  consid- 
ering. For example, with a strong demand for commitment people 
would be willing to accept a lower rate  of return  on illiquid assets than 
on liquid assets; if tax-favored saving incentives did not exist,  con- 
2.  The quote from Public Agenda in the paper's introduction  is ambiguous  as to 
whether  respondents  do not want their own penalties  reduced, or whether, as a matter 
of public policy, they think  that lower penalties  are a bad idea. 
3.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994); Gentry  and Milano (1998). 
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sumers  would  be willing to participate  in government-sponsored  illiquid 
accounts that were tax-penalized;  and consumers  would be willing to 
sign contracts  that stated, "If I take money out of my 401(k) or IRA 
before  age  y,  I will  pay x  percent  of  it to  .  .  ."  That none  of  these 
activities can be observed  in the real world is not in itself evidence that 
the demand  for commitment  is small. After all, several constraints  rule 
out such behavior: competition among lenders, who prefer to issue 
illiquid assets to minimize withdrawal  risks, will generate  higher  equi- 
librium  returns  for illiquid assets than  for liquid assets;5  the government 
already offers tax-favored saving accounts; and side contracts  of the 
type specified  above are  apparently  illegal.6  Nonetheless, such behavior 
would be observed if there were a high demand  for commitment  and if 
these constraints  did not exist. In my view, however, such behavior  is 
not very likely to exist to any great degree, even in the absence of the 
constraints.  This makes me skeptical  that the demand  for commitment 
is very large, but analysts can reasonably  differ on this point. 
Together, these factors present a significant challenge for the au- 
thors' set of assumptions.  Changing  any of the three  assumptions  would 
make the model more consistent with the real world. Setting the coef- 
ficient of relative  risk aversion  equal to 3 instead  of 1 would reduce  the 
value of commitment  to 2 percent, rather  than 36 percent,  of consump- 
tion at age twenty. Assuming that people are exponential discounters 
eliminates  the value of commitment.  And as the authors  note, assuming 
that  households  are naive-that  they think  they will not have such high 
short-term  discount rates in the future-also  eliminates their willing- 
ness to commit. Changing any of the three assumptions could also 
significantly reduce the effects of 401(k)s on saving, as the authors 
show and as is discussed below. 
The paper  contains an interesting  discussion of the discrepancy  be- 
tween actual  and  desired  saving rates. This discrepancy  no doubt  exists, 
but it may be more difficult to interpret  than the authors  imply. For 
example, they conclude  that  "such systematic,  self-acknowledged  error 
contradicts the standard economic  model of the maximizing con- 
sumer.  " I believe that  this claim is too strong. In conventional  theory, 
the consumer  has unlimited  wants  and  limited  resources.  In equilibrium, 
5.  I am indebted  to David Laibson  for this point. 
6.  Laibson  (1997a). 180  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
the consumer sets the marginal  rate of substitution  between any two 
goods equal to their price ratios. Thus the consumer  has positive mar- 
ginal utility of consuming  more  of all goods. If asked  whether  he would 
like to save more or "should" save more (or take more  leisure, or play 
more golf),  the consumer may well say yes,  but that response may 
simply reflect the existence of trade-offs, rather than regret, or the 
inability to follow through  on commitments.  Only if consumers  had a 
bliss point (for example, with quadratic  utility), above which the mar- 
ginal utility of increasing consumption  of an item is negative, would 
life-cycle consumers  necessarily be expected to answer in the way the 
authors  describe. More  generally, the paper  seems to imply that  all gaps 
between actions and intentions  are evidence against  rational  behavior. 
It seems that other explanations  might be worth  exploring. 
The paper  analyzes defined  contribution  plans that  are voluntary  and 
allow tax-deductible  employee contributions  and matching employer 
contributions.  The only such plans in the real world are 401(k) plans, 
which apply to the private  sector, and their  equivalents  in the nonprofit 
and public sectors. Other defined contribution  plans may not be vol- 
untary and may not allow for tax-deferred  employee contributions. 
Turning  to the paper's  results, in the no-401  (k) economy, the hyperbolic 
model generates  more borrowing-constrained  households  than  does the 
exponential model. Which model better fits the real world is unclear. 
Using data from the 1983 Survey of Consumer  Finances, if household 
borrowing  constraints  are defined in terms of liquid assets, the hyper- 
bolic results appear  to be closer to the SCF data than the exponential 
results (figures 10 to 12). However, using the same definition,  both the 
hyperbolic  discounting and exponential  discounting  models underpre- 
dict borrowing  constraints  among fifty to fifty-nine year olds by very 
large margins, even though  the models are calibrated  explicitly to rep- 
licate median  wealth  near  this age. By contrast,  if household  borrowing 
constraints  are defined in terms of net worth (table 6), both models do 
much better at predicting borrowing constraints  among fifty to fifty- 
nine year  olds, but  the likelihood  of being constrained  in the exponential 
discounting model is generally closer to the SCF data than is the hy- 
perbolic discounting model. The 1983 SCF also provides a third way 
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about borrowing  behavior.7  Using this definition, about 20 percent  of 
households  in the 1983 survey are constrained.  This finding  appears  to 
be closer to the exponential discounting results than the hyperbolic 
discounting  results. 
When 401(k) plans are introduced  in the model, the results are in 
some ways similar to the long-term findings of Engen, Gale,  and 
Scholz.8 With a 10 percent penalty, a 50 percent match rate, and a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion  of 3 (that is, an intertemporal  elas- 
ticity of substitution  of 0.33),  Engen, Gale, and Scholz find that 51 
percent  of 401  (k) contributions  are  net saving in the long-term,  and  that 
the national saving rate rises by about 1.0 percentage point. In the 
Laibson-Repetto-Tobacman  model,  using similar assumptions and 
either hyperbolic  or exponential  discounting, about 32 percent  of con- 
tributions  are net saving (table 16), and private saving rises by about 
1.5 percentage  points (table 14). The results  differ due to less persistent 
earnings  shocks in the present  model than  in those of Engen, Gale, and 
Scholz or other papers; a higher 401(k) contribution  limit; different 
wage profiles;  a different  bequest  process;  and  different  time preference 
rates. Nevertheless, the overall similarity  in long-term  results is strik- 
ing. 
When the coefficient of relative  risk aversion  is 1, (that  is, when the 
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  is 1), the effects of 401(k)s are 
much larger. The proportion  of contributions  that are net saving is still 
close to that of Engen, Gale, and Scholz, with estimates  of 54 percent 
in the exponential  discounting  model and 60 percent  in the hyperbolic 
discounting  model (table 12). The major  difference  is the overall impact 
on saving, with increases in the saving rate of 3.5 percentage  points in 
the exponential discounting model and 3.9  percentage points in the 
hyperbolic  discounting  model (table 10). This indicates  the central  im- 
portance  of the assumed  value of the intertemporal  elasticity of substi- 
tution, or equivalently  of the risk aversion coefficient. 
The intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  is a "deep structural" 
parameter.  In particular,  it measures  the curvature  of the utility func- 
tion, when utility depends on consumption in different periods. As 
such, in a constant  relative risk aversion  utility function, the intertem- 
poral elasticity of substitution  will always be the inverse of the coeffi- 
7.  See Jappelli  (1990). 
8.  Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994). 182  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
cient of relative risk aversion. In contrast, the observed response of 
consumption  to the interest rate-what  the authors  call the measured 
intertemporal  elasticity of substitution-which  is reported  in table 5 
depends on the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution,  on borrowing 
constraints, and on other factors. Researchers  have attempted  to esti- 
mate the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution  with micro-level and 
macro-level data and have generated  a wide variety of estimates. Ad- 
ditionally, it is unclear to what extent researchers  have identified  the 
true structural  parameter.  Nevertheless, several of those who have de- 
veloped simulation  models have surveyed the empirical literature  and 
settled on values of 0.33  or less  for the intertemporal  elasticity of 
substitution.9  Some interesting  recent evidence is presented  by Robert 
Barsky  and others, based on a unique  set of questions  in the Health  and 
Retirement  Study. They find that most individuals'  responses are con- 
sistent with low values of the intertemporal  elasticity of substitution: 
between  0.0 and  0.36, with a midpoint  estimate  of 0. 18. They conclude 
that "virtually  no respondents  have intertemporal  substitution  as elastic 
as that implied by log utility  [that is,  equal to  1]."10 
Regardless  of the value of the intertemporal  elasticity  of substitution, 
both the Engen-Gale-Scholz  and the Laibson-Repetto-Tobacman 
models overstate the long-term impact of 401(k)s on the saving rate. 
First, both use partial equilibrium models, but increases in saving 
should to some extent reduce the level of interest  rates. Second, both 
models assume universal  eligibility for 401(k)s. Third, for most work- 
ers, the effective limits on 401  (k)s, as set by their  firms, are  much  lower 
than $10,000. Fourth, neither  model allows for net borrowing,  in par- 
ticular, borrowing  against the 401(k) balance. Fifth, both models as- 
sume that  other  pensions stay intact  as 401(k)s expand, but there  has in 
fact been substantial  substitution  at the firm  level between 401(k)s and 
aftertax  thrift  plans, and between 401(k)s and defined  benefit and non- 
401(k) defined contribution  plans.-"  Sixth, in the real world there are 
already  many  other  existing illiquid assets. Adding  the nth  illiquid asset 
would presumably have much less  impact on saving, if the key is 
9.  For example, Auerbach  and Kotlikoff (1987); Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1994); 
Hubbard,  Skinner,  and Zeldes (1995). 
10. Barsky  and others  (1997, p. 564). 
11.  See Andrews  (1992) for the first  case; Papke  (1997) for the second. David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  183 
commitment  mechanism, than adding the first illiquid asset, which is 
what the models actually examine. 
Four additional  features of the model merit comment. First, by ig- 
noring the transition  to the steady state, the authors  overstate  govern- 
ment saving in the steady state. During the transition, there will be 
more  tax-deductible  contributions  than  taxable  withdrawals,  so govern- 
ment  will likely generate  debt. The model does not account  for the costs 
in steady state of paying off this previously  accumulated  debt. Thus the 
apparent  increase in government  revenues in the steady state may not 
translate  into higher net government  saving. 
Second, both  the hyperbolic  discounting  and  exponential  discounting 
models in this paper appear  to contain very high saving elasticities. 
Saving rises by 100 percent or more as a result of changing the tax 
treatment  of one type of saving and  raising  the one-period  rate  of return 
on that  saving from  about  3.75 percent  (assuming  a 25 percent  marginal 
tax rate) to 5.0 percent. This one-third  increase in the return,  coupled 
with the 100 percent  increase in saving, translates  into an elasticity of 
3-well  above standard  empirical  estimates. 
Third, the results on "percentage  changes in aggregate  saving" are 
difficult  to interpret.  It is never obvious which is the most appropriate 
real world saving rate to compare  with the simulated  saving rates. For 
example, the simulation  assumes  that  defined  benefit  pensions generate 
zero net saving, ignores  retained  earnings,  greatly  simplifies  the implicit 
treatment  of capital depreciation, and does not distinguish housing, 
other durables, and financial assets. Because the model's pre-401(k) 
saving rate  is only about  4 percent,  changing  any of these factors  would 
affect the saving rate and therefore affect the percentage change in 
overall saving. For example, if saving in pensions equals about  4 per- 
cent of GDP, as it did in the "pre-401(k) economy" of 1971-80,  and 
these pensions  are  included  in the pre-40  1  (k) saving  rate, the percentage 
increases  in aggregate  saving would be much  lower than  reported  in the 
model.12  It makes much more sense to focus discussion on percentage 
point changes in the saving rate (or in the capital output  ratio) and the 
proportion  of contributions  that are new saving. 
Finally, in my view, it is most appropriate  to interpret  the model as 
12.  Pension saving 1971-80 is from Sabelhaus  (1997). 184  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
indicating the effects of the introduction  of illiquid assets in general, 
rather  than the introduction  of 401(k) or defined contribution  plans. In 
the steady state, a very large portion of assets end up being held as 
401(k)s. For example, when the penalty is 10 percent and the match 
rate is 50 percent, about 85 percent of wealth appears  to be in such 
plans.  13  This is higher  than  the figure  for all illiquid  assets in the modern 
economy.14 However, if the model is really one of "illiquidity" rather 
than "401(k)s,"  it is important  to note that illiquid assets have existed 
for a substantial  period of time-historically,  the two most important 
have been housing and defined  benefit  pensions-and  that  they already 
account  for over two-thirds  of wealth.  15 Thus current  saving rates may 
already  reflect the long-term  impacts  of illiquid assets on the economy. 
In summary,  this is a fascinating  and  stimulating  paper  that  develops 
several new and important  directions  for the study of saving behavior. 
It is worth emphasizing  that there is a tremendous  amount  of diversity 
in households' sophistication,  tastes, and motives for saving, and that 
modeling the effects of voluntary tax-based saving incentives under 
these circumstances  can be quite difficult. There is no doubt, for ex- 
ample, that the authors are correct in saying that some people are 
extremely  unsophisticated  in saving, that  there  are major  gaps between 
stated  intentions  and  actual  behavior,  and  that  commitment  mechanisms 
can help some people to save. Yet these findings do not yield clear 
implications for the effects of existing saving incentives. Households 
that  participate  in such plans  tend  to have large  amounts  of other  saving. 
Thus it could be that many households are "problem savers" and that 
many households participate  in voluntary saving incentives, but that 
the two groups  have not overlapped  very much. It may also be that the 
paper  provides strong  motivation  for mandatory  saving rather  than  vol- 
untary incentives. It is extremely unlikely that any one model will 
accurately represent the saving behavior of  the entire population. 
13. In the exponential  discounting  model, the pre-401(k)  saving  rate  is 4.14 percent, 
the post-401(k) saving rate is  7.63  percent (table 10), and 53.9  percent of 401(k) 
contributions  are  net saving (table 12). This implies that  401(k) contributions  equal  6.47 
[(7.63-4.14)/0.539]  percent of GNP, and 84.8 percent (6.47/7.63)  of all saving, or 
wealth in the steady state. In the analogous  model with hyperbolic  discounting,  similar 
calculations  indicate  that about  88 percent  of all saving is in 401(k)s. 
14. See Laibson  (1997a). 
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Nevertheless, contributing  a fully detailed, alternative  framework  to 
analyze saving and public policy is a significant  accomplishment. 
I hope that future work along these lines provides information  on 
simulated  401(k) participation  rates and clarifies the interpretation  of 
the saving rate in the model, which would help provide some perspec- 
tive on the model fit; models the transition  from the short run to the 
steady state, to provide  a sense of what the short-  or intermediate-term 
effects might  be and  to capture  the full effects on government  financing; 
includes analysis of mandatory  saving schemes; and models the effects 
of an illiquid saving account  with no employer  match and no tax pref- 
erence. The last item, in particular,  would provide some evidence of 
the value of commitment, per se,  that could be compared with real 
world phenomena. Further  research  on the intertemporal  elasticity of 
substitution  would also be of use. While these issues remain  unresolved, 
the present  paper  makes a major  and welcome contribution  toward  our 
understanding  of saving behavior  and public policy. 
George A.  Akerlof: This is a very fine paper. It takes an idea that 
fundamentally  revises standard  consumer theory and applies it to ag- 
gregate  saving in the United States. The paper  also makes  the important 
technical contribution  of implementing  new simulation  techniques  for 
time-inconsistent consumption paths. These techniques represent a 
great leap forward  in the ability of economists to critique  policies that 
affect saving behavior. 
The basic idea behind this paper  is that present  consumption  is par- 
ticularly salient in consumption  choice. This is modeled by the hyper- 
bolic discount  model, which says that  short-run  discount  rates  are  higher 
than long-run  rates of discount. It has been known since the work of 
Strotz that such variable  discounting will create time-inconsistency  in 
decisionmaking.  1 The contribution  of the recent  work  on procrastination 
and saving has been to follow Strotz with the assertion  that whatever 
may be the mathematical inconveniences engendered by the time- 
inconsistency of plans, this is in fact the right way to model saving 
behavior  because it corresponds  to actual  consumer  behavior. Support- 
ing this argument,  there  is a considerable  body of psychological exper- 
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iment  that would motivate such hyperbolic  discounting, including  data 
on the discount rates of rats. 
In the present paper the authors  assume that subjects have correct 
expectations:  they have rational  expectations  and  are  aware  of their  own 
time inconsistency. As a result, these consumers  do not say, "I should 
spend today, because tomorrow  I am going to begin to save." Instead, 
they say to themselves, "I am impatient  today, but I will be equally 
impatient  tomorrow.  If I save today, I will be impatient  tomorrow  and 
will spend the money tomorrow  rather  than save it for my retirement, 
so I might as well spend  today.  " Curiously,  that  use of perfect  foresight 
is just as self-defeating as assuming  incorrectly  that  today's bad behav- 
ior is only an aberration  because tomorrow  one will be good. 
There are two ways out of the dilemma of low saving for the con- 
sumers in this model. The first is to precommit  to saving. There are 
many devices that allow such precommitment,  either as an individual 
decision-for  example, pension plans-or  as a collective decision- 
for example, social security. Likewise, one of the attractions  of home 
ownership  may be the forced saving entailed in paying off a mortgage. 
An alternative  solution to the dilemma of low saving in the Laibson- 
Repetto-Tobacman  model with perfect foresight is to build up a large 
stock of liquid assets. In that case, the marginal  dollar saved today is 
not likely to be spent at some nearby  time, because of the salience of 
present  purchases, but instead will be spread  over a long period, as in 
the standard  version of the permanent  income hypothesis. Thus the 
effects of hyperbolic  discounting  are small. (This is an implication  of 
the Euler equation.) 
The policy innovation  of this paper  is a shift in emphasis  regarding 
saving behavior. In the traditional  models of constant  discounting, as 
opposed to hyperbolic  discounting, undersaving  occurs because savers 
face the wrong rate of return.  Taxes on capital income generate  a gap 
between society'  s marginal  rate  of transformation  and  consumers'  mar- 
ginal rate  of substitution  between current  and  future  consumption.  Mar- 
tin Feldstein, in particular,  has demonstrated  that  this gap induces  large 
deadweight losses as a result of even small taxes on capital income.2 
The present paper, while possibly suggesting a reason for the exacer- 
bation  of deadweight  losses due to capital  income taxation, emphasizes 
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another  aspect of policy toward  saving. It analyzes, for the first  time in 
any realistic way, the gain in utility that will occur if consumers are 
able to precommit  saving behavior. 
Three  nature  facts especially favor  this model over traditional  models 
of constant  discounting  and consistent  consumption  paths:  the popular- 
ity of social security, the saving behavior of young workers, and the 
ubiquity of employer-based  pension plans. The hyperbolic model ex- 
plains the uniform popularity  of social security, which acts as a pre- 
commitment  device to redistribute  consumption  from times when peo- 
ple would be tempted to overspend-during  their working lives-to 
times when they would otherwise  be spending  too little-in  retirement. 
Even with the distortions entailed in such taxation with hyperbolic 
discounting, as in this model, such a transfer  is most likely to improve 
welfare significantly. The hyperbolic discounting model explains, as 
the standard  model will not, why the young as well as the old should 
be particularly  enthusiastic  about social security. 
A second aspect of reality that is consistent with this model but 
inconsistent  with the standard  model is the low levels of liquid assets 
of younger  people. Previous work by Engen shows that with plausibly 
calibrated  parameters,  deadweight  losses due to taxation  of capital in- 
come with uncertain  labor income are an order  of magnitude  less than 
those with certainty-equivalent  earnings, if consumption  expenditures 
are liquidity constrained.3  This occurs because early in their careers, 
workers  will build up a buffer stock of savings for precautionary  mo- 
tives. In particular,  they want to have a nest egg in the event of un- 
employment. Because these buffer-stock  savings are acquired  early in 
workers'  careers,  and  because  early savings  have a long gestation  period 
before retirement,  they will greatly reduce the deadweight  loss in the 
standard  (constant discount) model. But the analysis with hyperbolic 
discounting  is very different. Impatient  young workers  are discouraged 
from  building  up liquid assets to spend  in the event of job loss, because 
these liquid assets would be a temptation.  Since consumption  today is 
particularly  salient, as it would also be in the near  future,  workers  come 
close to spending all of their income early in their careers. Tables 6 
and 7 show that high school dropouts  and high school graduates  tend 
to conform  to this pattern  of saving: they have almost no liquid assets. 
3.  Engen (1994). 188  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
This important  fact is consistent  with hyperbolic,  but not with constant, 
discounting. This putative difference between the hyperbolic and the 
constant  discounting  models is significant.  Enough is known about  the 
asset levels of young people-for  example, at the time of divorce-to 
suggest that the qualitative  predictions  of the model must be right. 
The third nature  fact explained by the authors' model is the extent 
to which employees delegate  to their  employers  the task of setting aside 
pension funds to save for their retirement.  These pension plans are a 
form of precommitment  that would be predicted  by the model. Indeed, 
analysis of the welfare benefits of such pension plans is the central 
feature  of this paper. 
It is my duty as a discussant  to generate  a few quibbles. An important 
contribution  to the literature  on saving is that of Bernheim, Skinner, 
and Weinberg, who find that consumption declines dramatically  for 
every wealth quartile  on retirement.4  Using British  data, James  Banks, 
Richard  Blundell, and Sarah  Tanner  similarly find large drops in con- 
sumption.5  Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg argue that the drop in 
consumption  at retirement  is much  larger  than  should  be expected from 
work-related  expenditures,  especially the drop  in such nonwork  related 
categories as food consumed  at home. These findings strongly suggest 
the presence of considerable myopia in consumption behavior. The 
basic Euler equation of the Laibson-Repetto-Tobacman  model would 
seem to be violated by such a large downward  discontinuity  at retire- 
ment. The authors  are aware  of this problem:  they have found that  very 
low values of 1B  are capable of producing  significant  falls in consump- 
tion at retirement,  but they lead to consumption  paths  that  are  otherwise 
implausible. 
Another  violation of the Euler  condition  is suggested  by John  Shea.6 
He finds  that  workers  under  union contracts  with wage cuts reduce  their 
consumption  not at the time when the cut is announced,  but when the 
pay cut is actually received. 
These deviations  from  what  is easily explained  by the authors'  model 
I consider to be rather  superficial;  but at the same time, they indicate 
that  the model of hyperbolic  discounting  presented  here should  be used 
for general messages about saving behavior only, and should not be 
4.  Bernheim,  Skinner,  and Weinberg  (1997). 
5.  Banks, Blundell, and Tanner  (1995). 
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taken  literally to design policies. For example, the model suggests that 
workers  will voluntarily  make  rational  precommitments  if saving plans 
allow them to do so.  The consumption discontinuities at retirement 
suggest, however, that  workers  are  yet more  present-oriented  than  even 
the model of this paper would predict. Indeed, naifs have almost no 
reason  to precommit  voluntarily:  they think  that  they will behave  better 
next period. And William Gale's comment  gives further  evidence that 
people tend not to take advantage  of opportunities  to precommit. For 
that  reason,  those designing  policy of, for example, 401  (k)s and  pension 
plans should not take the model as the literal truth.  It would be a grave 
error  to take away from this paper  the message that strengthening  pre- 
commitment  devices of existing programs  is all, or even a substantial 
part, of what is needed to rectify saving policy. There is also a need 
for nonvoluntary  sources of saving, such as often occurs in pension 
plans. 
To summarize,  this is a very important  paper. It makes operational 
a new paradigm  of consumption  behavior  that is much more sensitive 
to the way that people, pigeons, and rats actually behave than is the 
standard  constant  discount  model. This paradigm  suggests welfare  gains 
from policies that commit people to saving (albeit forcibly, rather  than 
voluntarily). Indeed, the institutions  that have been either collectively 
chosen or encouraged  by provisions of the tax code to provide for old- 
age income-in  particular,  social security  and  employer-based  pension 
plans-indicate  the all-important  role of governmental  policies in coun- 
teracting  procrastination  in saving. 
General discussion: In reply to William Gale's comments about the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, Laibson said that  previous authors 
had based their calibration  choices on the incorrect  assumption  that  the 
measured  elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  (the sensitivity of the 
slope of the consumption  path  to changes  in the real interest  rate)  equals 
the true  value of the elasticity of intertemporal  substitution  (the inverse 
of the coefficient of relative aversion). In a buffer-stock world, the 
measured  elasticity actually lies below the true elasticity. Hence, pre- 
vious calibrations  of the coefficient of relative risk aversion suffered 
from an upward  bias. In addition,  Laibson  suggested several  reasons  to 
be skeptical of the survey evidence of Robert  Barsky and others cited 
by Gale. In particular,  their survey biases respondents  toward  picking 190  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
a relatively or perfectly flat consumption  path (due to framing  effects, 
end-point aversion, and discontinuity aversion) for all values of the 
interest  rate. 
Christopher  Carroll  offered an explanation  for why the authors  found 
a much larger  response to 401(k) availability  in the exponential  model 
than previous researchers  have found. The interest  elasticity of saving 
in a model with exponential  discounting  and uncertainty  depends cru- 
cially on whether consumers  would save or dissave in the absence of 
uncertainty,  which depends, in turn, on the relationship  between inter- 
est rates, the time preference  rate, and the growth  rate of income. As 
consumers  become more "impatient" in this sense, their interest  elas- 
ticity of saving approaches  zero, since very impatient  consumers  only 
hold assets for precautionary  reasons, and changing the interest rates 
has little effect on the precautionary  motivation  for saving. By contrast, 
"patient" consumers, who would be savers in the absence of uncer- 
tainty, can have extremely high interest elasticities of saving. Carroll 
inferred  that the authors' choices of parameter  values, especially for 
the intertemporal  elasticity of  substitution, appear to result in con- 
sumers who, prior to 401(k) availability, are close to the knife edge 
between  patience  and  impatience.  When  offered  the substantially  higher 
aftertax rate of return  of a 401(k) plan, they decisively move to the 
patient side, where the interest  elasticity of saving is high. 
Benjamin Friedman  believed that at many if not most U.S.  firms, 
the great  majority  of employees are unwilling to participate  in 401(k)s 
unless they are, in effect, bribed  to do so by the matching  contributions 
of their employers. He found this fact problematic,  whether  from the 
perspective of tax advantages  or an attraction  based on commitment. 
William Gale added  other  reasons  to question  how good a commitment 
mechanism  401(k) plans are. People can and do borrow  against  401(k) 
balances. Households that are eligible for 401(k)s tend to have higher 
mortgage  debt  than  other  households, controlling  for other  factors. And 
people may unintentionally  "undo" the saving effects of 401(k)s by 
borrowing, even if they do not mean to arbitrage  the system. For ex- 
ample, a household that starts contributing  to a 401(k) but does not 
change any consumption  behavior would, at the end of the year, end 
up with more debt. He noted that an earlier  paper  by David Laibson  on 
hyperbolic discounting, undersaving, and saving policy discusses the David I. Laibson, Andrea  Repetto, and Jeremy Tobacman  191 
fact that one can borrow against 401(k)s and undo the commitment 
mechanism. 
William Dickens believed that the hyperbolic  model did not capture 
the reasons for commitment through instruments  such as Christmas 
clubs and savings bonds. In his view, the main motivation for these 
forms of investment  is to insulate savings from impulse spending. Peo- 
ple know that in some periods they will not be able to control them- 
selves, but will spend  more  than  they should. Such episodic and  unpre- 
dictable behavior is time inconsistent but would require a different 
theoretical  model than the authors'  hyperbolic. Gale added that some 
of the evidence presented in favor of psychological models may be 
overstated.  Whether  households  are saving enough  for retirement  is not 
entirely clear, and there is substantial  heterogeneity  in saving behavior 
and the adequacy of wealth preparations.  Whether  consumers imple- 
ment downward-sloping  consumption profiles is not obvious either. 
There is  some evidence that most working households that are not 
borrowing  constrained  exhibit rising consumption  profiles. 
Gale suggested that household responses on motives for saving in 
the Survey of Consumer  Finances may be a useful source for under- 
standing  saving. In the 1995 SCF, 31 percent  of all households stated 
that  concerns  about  unemployment  or uncertain  income were a primary 
motive for saving-the  single most frequent  response. This frequency 
was fairly constant  across age groups  and  also across  years. The second 
most frequent  response was saving for retirement,  cited as a primary 
motive by 23 percent  of households  in the 1995 SCF. Not surprisingly, 
the frequency  of this response  increases  with age until it drops  after  age 
sixty-five. Thus people seem to feel that  they are saving predominantly 
for precautionary  reasons  and  for retirement.  One alternative  reason  for 
saving suggested by the SCF is: "wise/prudent  thing to do; good dis- 
cipline to save; habit." Only a tiny fraction  of households  cited this as 
a primary  saving motive in the 1995 SCF. Another  possible response 
in the survey is:  "don't/can't save; have no money."  Only about 
6 percent of households under  the age of sixty-five gave this response 
in  1995. Gale reasoned that these findings are not what one would 
expect from hyperbolic  consumers. 192  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity, 1:1998 
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